The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Myth of Morality
Abstract
In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. Joyce argues that natural selection is to blame, in that it has provided us with a tendency to invest the world with values that it does not contain, and demands that it does not make. Should we therefore do away with morality, as we did away with other faulty notions such as witches? Possibly not. We may be able to carry on with morality as a 'useful fiction' - allowing it to have a regulative influence on our lives and decisions, perhaps even playing a central role - while not committing ourselves to believing or asserting falsehoods, and thus not being subject to accusations of 'error'.
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Darwin, C. (1872) · J. Murray eBooks · doi:10.1037/10001-000 · Cited by 11,657
A treatise of human nature (1739-40)
Hume, D. (1996) · The Sublime · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511620409.040 · Cited by 9,842
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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
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Korsgaard, C. M., & O'Neill, O. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 · Cited by 4,013
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980
Williams, B. (1981) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165860 · Cited by 3,068
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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
Brink, D. O. (1989) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624612 · Cited by 1,926
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Cited by
Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons
Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D. (2017) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9 · Cited by 368
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Kahane, G. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x · Cited by 282
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
SARKISSIAN, H., PARK, J., TIEN, D., WRIGHT, J. C., & KNOBE, J. (2011) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x · Cited by 184
“Innate Ideas as a Naturalistic Source of Metaphysical Knowledge”
Stewart-Williams, S. (2005) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-004-6835-7 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Joyce, R.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2001-11-22
- OpenAlex
- W1486234110
- Cited by
- 817
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 6.61
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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