Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: the type that does the trick
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The question of whether non-human animals are conscious is of fundamental importance. There are already good reasons to think that many are, based on evolutionary continuity and other considerations. However, the hypothesis is notoriously resistant to direct empirical test. Numerous studies have shown behaviour in animals analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour. Fewer probe whether the same mechanisms are in use. One promising line of evidence about consciousness in other animals derives from experiments on metamemory. A study by Hampton (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(9):5359-5362, 2001) suggests that at least one rhesus macaque can use metamemory to predict whether it would itself succeed on a delayed matching-to-sample task. Since it is not plausible that mere meta-representation requires consciousness, Hampton's study invites an important question: what kind of metamemory is good evidence for consciousness? This paper argues that if it were found that an animal had a memory trace which allowed it to use information about a past perceptual stimulus to inform a range of different behaviours, that would indeed be good evidence that the animal was conscious. That functional characterisation can be tested by investigating whether successful performance on one metamemory task transfers to a range of new tasks. The paper goes on to argue that thinking about animal consciousness in this way helps in formulating a more precise functional characterisation of the mechanisms of conscious awareness.
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Citations
Cites
Priming and Human Memory Systems
Tulving, E., & Schacter, D. L. (1990) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2296719 · Cited by 2,595
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 3×
“A third proposal is that Meta-Memory brings the perceptual memory into the space of reasons (McDowell 1994), making it available for the rational control of action (Baars 1988; Dehaene and Naccache 2001).2 That, too, connects with an intuitive first-person perspective on memory discrimination tasks.”
BackgroundMethodClassical conditioning and brain systems: the role of awareness
Clark, R. E., & Squire, L. R. (1998) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.280.5360.77 · Cited by 1,138 · cited 1×
“By contrast, it seems that trace conditioning—where the air puff occurs shortly after the tone has stopped—correlates with subjects’ conscious awareness of the contingency (Clark et al. 2001; Clark and Squire 1998; Perruchet et al. 2006).”
BackgroundRosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632 · cited 2×
“In searching for the additional factor X, other philosophers argue that only finegrained contents are made conscious by meta-representation ( Carruthers 2000 ).”
BackgroundRhesus monkeys know when they remember
Hampton, R. R. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071600998 · Cited by 493
Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys
Kornell, N., Son, L. K., & Terrace, H. S. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01850.x · Cited by 341 · cited 1×
“In experiments of this kind (e.g., Kornell et al. 2007) commentary key responses are made immediately after the monkey has made its discriminative response.”
Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
Jack, A. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1 · Cited by 198
Cited by
The neural basis of metacognitive ability
Fleming, S. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0417 · Cited by 747
“For present purposes, we focus on monitoring processes that are consciously reportable, and thus available for deployment outside of a ‘closed-loop’ optimisation of the task at hand (see also [127]).”
BackgroundMetacognition: computation, biology and function
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021 · Cited by 344
“As noted above, a deflationary explanation of some types of metacognitive report that does not appeal to meta-representation may be possible, and it will important to consider this possibility on a case-by-case basis [38].”
BackgroundThe search for invertebrate consciousness
Birch, J. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12351 · Cited by 254
The Neural Basis of Metacognitive Ability
Fleming, S. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45190-4_11 · Cited by 50
Mental representation and episodic-like memory of own actions in dogs
Fugazza, C., Pongrácz, P., Pogány, Á., Lenkei, R., & Miklósi, Á. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-67302-0 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Shea, N., & Heyes, C.
- Venue
- Biology & Philosophy
- Published
- 2009-07-29
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 95-110
- ISSN
- 0169-3867 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8404
- OpenAlex
- W1998770726
- Cited by
- 30
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 3.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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