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Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Jack, A · 2001 · Cognition

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 182 of the 193 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Most 'theories of consciousness' are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states - the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-processing models that can account for 'Type-C' processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology.

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Metadata

Authors
Jack, A.
Affiliations
University College London (GB)
Corresponding author
Jack, A
ORCID
Jack, A
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2001-04
Volume
79
Issue
1-2
Pages
161-196
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2155274127
Cited by
198
References
193
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 6
FWCI
16.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • CogPrints (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • SDL (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
self-reflection, consciousness studies, theory of consciousness, perceptual consciousness, intentional action, prefrontal cortex, information processing model
MeSH terms
Awareness, Consciousness, Humans, Psychological Theory, Prefrontal Cortex

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1
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Jack, A. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.