Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 182 of the 193 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Most 'theories of consciousness' are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states - the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-processing models that can account for 'Type-C' processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
James, W. (1913) · Henry Holt and Company eBooks · doi:10.1037/11059-000 · Cited by 25,226 · cited 1×
“The phenomenology of perception and action have long been thought of as distinct (e.g. James, 1890).”
BackgroundThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition
Kuhn, T. S., & Hacking, I. (2012) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226458144.001.0001 · Cited by 21,170 · cited 1×
“Kuhn (1962) eloquently argues that the observations that are used to support theories in physics are always theory-laden.”
BackgroundThe magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.
Miller, G. A. (1956) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0043158 · Cited by 17,812
The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.
Miller, G. A. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.2.343 · Cited by 17,161
Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid
WATSON, J. D., & CRICK, F. H. C. (1953) · Nature · doi:10.1038/171737a0 · Cited by 13,584 · cited 2×
“…of the double-helix structure of DNA provides a classical example of a scientific identification between a physical entity and a theoretical entity: as Watson & Crick (1953) pointed out, the structure proposed suggested a mechanism for replication, a property clearly essential for the gene.”
BackgroundTelling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317 · cited 1×
“Firstly, the instructions for ‘think aloud’ protocols discourage subjects from providing elaborate interpretations of the mental states they report, thus helping to ameliorate the difficulties associated with rationalisation (Gazzaniga, 1985; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).”
BackgroundDoes the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599 · cited 1×
“Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Brothers, 1995; Frith & Frith, 1999).”
The attention system of the human brain
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.000325 · Cited by 8,070 · cited 2×
“However, it would appear to be the more activated the more concentration is required ( Posner & Petersen, 1990 ) and a meta-analysis has shown that the anterior cingulate tends to be highly active when there is conflict between competing inputs and/or responses (Carter, Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999).”
BackgroundNagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn, T. S. (1996) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226458106.001.0001 · Cited by 7,281
Cited by
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.946 · Cited by 2,067
Meditation states and traits: EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging studies.
Cahn, B. R., & Polich, J. (2006) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.180 · Cited by 1,734
“…emphasizes the need to define the underlying neurophysiological correlates of conscious states and internal experience (Delacour, 1997; Gallagher, 1997; Jack & Roepstorff, 2002; Jack & Shallice, 2001; Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002; McIntosh, Fitzpatrick, & Friston, 2001; Varela, 1996).”
BackgroundUsing Neuroscience to Help Understand Fear and Anxiety: A Two-System Framework
LeDoux, J. E., & Pine, D. S. (2016) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.16030353 · Cited by 1,035
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
“The most common method is the use of verbal self-report (20, 47, 48).”
MethodThe Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
“See also, recently: Shoemaker 1994; Lycan 1996; Dretske 2000; Jack and Shallice 2001; Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2004, 2006; Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2005; and most of the essays collected in Gertler 2003, among many others.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Jack, A.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Jack, A
- ORCID
- Jack, A
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 161-196
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2155274127
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 193
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 16.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CogPrints (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- SDL (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- self-reflection, consciousness studies, theory of consciousness, perceptual consciousness, intentional action, prefrontal cortex, information processing model
- MeSH terms
- Awareness, Consciousness, Humans, Psychological Theory, Prefrontal Cortex
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1
- The paper
- Jack, A. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.