Sharing Our Concepts with Machines
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Abstract
As AI systems become increasingly competent language users, it is an apt moment to consider what it would take for machines to understand human languages. This paper considers whether either language models such as GPT-3 or chatbots might be able to understand language, focusing on the question of whether they could possess the relevant concepts. A significant obstacle is that systems of both kinds interact with the world only through text, and thus seem ill-suited to understanding utterances concerning the concrete objects and properties which human language often describes. Language models cannot understand human languages because they perform only linguistic tasks, and therefore cannot represent such objects and properties. However, chatbots may perform tasks concerning the non-linguistic world, so they are better candidates for understanding. Chatbots can also possess the concepts necessary to understand human languages, despite their lack of perceptual contact with the world, due to the language-mediated concept-sharing described by social externalism about mental content.
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Cites
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Cited by
Do Language Models’ Words Refer?
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“By contrast, we will argue that standard externalist accounts are at least prima facie compelling with respect to LMs. Butlin (2021) argues that externalism vindicates referentiality for chatbots but not for LMs. DeVault, Oved, and Stone (2006) argued that externalism did not vindicate referentiality for NLP as it exi…”
BackgroundCreating a large language model of a philosopher
Schwitzgebel, E., Schwitzgebel, D., & Strasser, A. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12466 · Cited by 73
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Do Vision and Language Models Share Concepts? A Vector Space Alignment Study
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“…Sahlgren and Carlsson, 2021; Piantadosi and Hill, 2022), 3 whereas some have posited that a form of externalist referential semantics is possible, at least for chatbots engaged in direct conversation (Cappelen and Dever, 2021; Butlin, 2021; Mollo and Milli`ere, 2023; Mandelkern and Linzen, 2023).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Butlin, P.
- Venue
- Erkenntnis
- Published
- 2021-11-26
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3079-3095
- ISSN
- 0165-0106 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8420
- OpenAlex
- W3211859752
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 2.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- Licence
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
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