CoChat

Sharing Our Concepts with Machines

Open access
Butlin, Patrick · 2023 · Erkenntnis
Cited by 22

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

As AI systems become increasingly competent language users, it is an apt moment to consider what it would take for machines to understand human languages. This paper considers whether either language models such as GPT-3 or chatbots might be able to understand language, focusing on the question of whether they could possess the relevant concepts. A significant obstacle is that systems of both kinds interact with the world only through text, and thus seem ill-suited to understanding utterances concerning the concrete objects and properties which human language often describes. Language models cannot understand human languages because they perform only linguistic tasks, and therefore cannot represent such objects and properties. However, chatbots may perform tasks concerning the non-linguistic world, so they are better candidates for understanding. Chatbots can also possess the concepts necessary to understand human languages, despite their lack of perceptual contact with the world, due to the language-mediated concept-sharing described by social externalism about mental content.

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Research works printed but not linked: 35

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Metadata

Authors
Butlin, P.
Venue
Erkenntnis
Published
2021-11-26
Volume
88
Issue
7
Pages
3079-3095
ISSN
  • 0165-0106 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8420
OpenAlex
W3211859752
Cited by
22
References
16
FWCI
2.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid
Licence

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Butlin, P. (2023). Sharing Our Concepts with Machines. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00491-w

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