The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Robots, law and the retribution gap
Open accessAbstract
We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap arises from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social implications of this gap.
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“As noted by Danaher (2016), the desire to find a scapegoat to satisfy these feelings may also be fuelled.”
From Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them (2021) · cites this paper as Danaher (2016)
Citations
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Cited by
Six Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence Grand Challenges
Ozmen Garibay, O., Winslow, B., Andolina, S., Antona, M., Bodenschatz, A., Coursaris, C., Falco, G., Fiore, S. M., Garibay, I., Grieman, K., et al. (2023) · International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction · doi:10.1080/10447318.2022.2153320 · Cited by 501
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Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
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“In discussing these topics together, I follow writers such as Purves et al. (2015) and Danaher (2016), who also explore the important parallels between these different technologies and the harms they might cause.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Danaher, J.
- Affiliations
- Ollscoil na Gaillimhe – University of Galway (IE)
- Corresponding author
- Danaher, John
- ORCID
- Danaher, John
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2016-05-18
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 299-309
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W2395480801
- Semantic Scholar
- 3889af2460655071aae2608447930e60365fdacf
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 18.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion)
- ARAN (University of Galway Research Repository) (Ollscoil na Gaillimhe – University of Galway) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Arrow@dit (Dublin Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- University of Galway Research Repository (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Research Repository UCD (University College Dublin) (cc-by-nc)
- Funders
- Irish Research Council (New Horizons)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Keywords
- robots, robotization, retribution, legal liability, moral responsibility, legal personhood of robots
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