The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions
Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of downward social information in contribution decisions to fund public goods. We describe the results of a field experiment run in conjunction with the fundraising campaigns of a public radio station. Renewing members are presented with social information (information about another donor's contribution) which is either above or below their previous (last year's) contribution. We find that respondents change their contribution in the direction of the social information; increasing their contribution when the social information is above their previous contribution, and decreasing their contribution when the social information is below. We hypothesize about the psychological motivations that may cause the results and test these hypotheses by comparing the relative size of the upward and downward shifts. These results improve our understanding of cooperation in public good provision and suggest differential costs and benefits to fundraisers in providing social information.
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Cites
A theory of social comparison processes
Festinger, L. (1954) · Human Relations · doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 · Cited by 20,926
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
List, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324392 · Cited by 535 · cited 1×
“These results improve our understanding of cooperation in public good provision and suggest differential costs and benefits to fundraisers in providing social information.”
Background
Cited by
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
The importance of belonging and the avoidance of social risk taking in adolescence
Tomova, L., Andrews, J. L., & Blakemore, S.-J. (2021) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2021.100981 · Cited by 196
Promoting cooperation in the field
Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006 · Cited by 178
The Consumer Experience of Responsibilization: The Case of Panera Cares
Eckhardt, G. M., & Dobscha, S. (2019) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-018-3795-4 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Croson, R., & Shang, J. Y.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 221-233
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W1993754114
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 36.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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