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Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
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Metadata
- Authors
- Oates, W. E.
- Venue
- International Tax and Public Finance
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 349-373
- ISSN
- 0927-5940 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6970
- OpenAlex
- W2095862456
- Cited by
- 1,226
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 158.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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