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Framing a phenomenological interview: what, why and how

Høffding, Simon, Martiny, Kristian · 2016 · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Cited by 247

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Metadata

Authors
Høffding, S., & Martiny, K.
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Published
2015-08-11
Volume
15
Issue
4
Pages
539-564
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
OpenAlex
W1163797443
Cited by
247
References
9
FWCI
9.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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Høffding, S., & Martiny, K. (2016). Framing a phenomenological interview: what, why and how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9433-z

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