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Cited by 1,104Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyMental Health and Psychiatry

Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

Zahavi, Dan·2005·The MIT Press eBooks
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/6541.001.0001
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Abstract

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct—or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research. Philosophical phenomenology—as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others—not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need—given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity—for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance. Bradford Books imprint

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  • Axiom four of IIT 3.0 confounds integration with the unity of conscious experience.

    “Axiom four of IIT 3.0, the axiom of integration, confounds integration with what phenomenologists call the unity of conscious experience [11–13].”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [12]

  • The second part of the axiom of information is Tononi's addition of information exclusion and is not part of phenomenology.

    “the second part of the definition (an experience is what it is by differing from an immense number of other possible experiences) is clearly Tononi’s addition of information exclusion to this axiom and is not a part of phenomenology [11–13].”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [12]

  • Resources for addressing such processes lie in the literature on selfhood: phenomenological accounts emphasizing pre-reflective self-presence, narrative theories conceptualizing selfhood through autobiographical reasoning, and Foucauldian approaches highlighting how discursive regimes structure self-interpretation.

    “Resources for addressing such processes lie in the literature on selfhood: phenomenological accounts emphasizing pre-reflective self-presence [33], narrative theories conceptualizing selfhood through autobiographical reasoning [34], and Foucauldian approaches highlighting how discursive regimes structure self-interpretation [35].”

    From Encountering Generative AI: Narrative Self-Formation and Technologies of the Self Among Young Adults (2026) · cites this paper as [33]

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Authors
Zahavi, D.
Corresponding author
Zahavi, Dan
ORCID
Zahavi, Dan
Venue
The MIT Press eBooks
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2005-12-09
DOI
10.7551/mitpress/6541.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4236107575
Cited by
1,104
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 69 · 2025: 76 · 2024: 71 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 88 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 168 · 2018: 54 · 2017: 78 · 2016: 43 · 2015: 40 · 2014: 42 · 2013: 53 · 2012: 54
FWCI
12.02
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
self, subjectivity, consciousness, self-awareness, first-person perspective, self-experience, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, consciousness studies

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