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Cited by 89Embodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyPhilosophical and Theoretical Analysis

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Enactive becoming

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Di Paolo, Ezequiel A.·2021·Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
DOI 10.1007/s11097-019-09654-1
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Abstract

The enactive approach provides a perspective on human bodies in their organic, sensorimotor, social, and linguistic dimensions, but many fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. A crucial desideratum for a theory of human bodies is that it be able to account for concrete human becoming. In this article I show that enactive theory possesses resources to achieve this goal. Being an existential structure, human becoming is best approached by a series of progressive formal indications. I discuss three standpoints on human becoming as open, indeterminate, and therefore historical using the voices of Pico della Mirandola, Gordon W. Allport, and Paulo Freire. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation we move from an existential to an ontological register in looking at modes of embodied becoming. His scheme of interpretation of the relation between modes of individuation allows us to understand human becoming in terms of a tendency to neotenization. I compare this ontology with an enactive theoretical account of the dimensions of embodiment, finding several compatibilities and complementarities. Various forms of bodily unfinishedness in enaction fit the Simondonian ontology and the existential analysis, where transindividuality corresponds to participatory sense-making and Freire’s joint becoming of individuals and communities correlates with the open tensions in linguistic bodies between incorporation and incarnation of linguistic acts. I test some of this ideas by considering the plausibility of artificial bodies and personal becoming from an enactive perspective, using the case of replicants in the film Blade Runner. The conclusion is that any kind of personhood, replicants included, requires living through an actual history of concrete becoming.

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Metadata

Authors
Di Paolo, E. A.
ORCID
Di Paolo, Ezequiel A.
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2020-01-11
Volume
20
Issue
5
Pages
783-809
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
DOI
10.1007/s11097-019-09654-1
OpenAlex
W4240778737
Cited by
89
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 6
FWCI
6.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
University of Sussex
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis
Keywords
enactive theory, human becoming, embodiment, Gilbert Simondon, existential structure, transindividuality, participatory sense-making, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Paulo Freire, artificial bodies, replicants, Blade Runner, personhood

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