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A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds

Jacobs, Jonathan D. · 2010 · Philosophical Studies

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Research works printed but not linked: 45

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  10. Fara, M., & Williamson, T. (2005). Counterparts and actuality. Mind, 114(453), 1–30. · DOI
  11. Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1–16. · DOI · Paper page
  12. Fitch, G. W. (1996). In defence of Aristotelian actualism. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 53–71.
  13. Handfield, T. (2004). Counterlegals and necessary laws. The Philosophical Quarterly, 54(216), 402–419. · doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00360.x
  14. Hawthorne, J. (2001). Causal structuralism. Philosophical Perspectives, 15, 361–378.
  15. Heil, J. (2004). Properties and powers. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1, 223–254. · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267729.003.0009
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  18. Kment, B. (2006). Counterfactuals and the analysis of necessity. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, 237–301. · DOI
  19. Lange, M. (2005). A counterfactual analysis of the concepts of logical truth and necessity. Philosophical Studies, 125, 277–303. · DOI
  20. Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
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  25. Merricks, T. (2003). The end of counterpart theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 100(10), 521–549. · doi:10.5840/jphil2003100101
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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Jacobs, J. D.
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Published
2009-07-25
Volume
151
Issue
2
Pages
227-248
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
OpenAlex
W1976922116
Cited by
215
References
5
FWCI
2.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11098-009-9427-1
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Jacobs, J. D. (2010). A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9427-1

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