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A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds
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Cites
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Cited by
Tugby, M. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1036-x · Cited by 11
Shoring up divine simplicity against modal collapse: a powers account
LENOW, J. E. (2021) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412518000859 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Jacobs, J. D.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2009-07-25
- Volume
- 151
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 227-248
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1976922116
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
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