The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 136 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
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“Moreover, asCuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) emphasize, a given system of rules might only count as a moral system if it agrees with a sufficiently large number of claims that they call 'moral fixed points'”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014
Citations
Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Audi, R. (2004). The good in the right. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aune, B. (1985). Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Blackburn, S. (1971). Moral realism. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Blackburn, S. (1985). Errors and the phenomenology of value. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
- Cuneo, T. (forthcoming b). The evolutionary objection to knowing moral reasons. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FitzPatrick, W. (forthcoming b). Why there is no Darwinian dilemma for moral realism. In M. Bergman & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to religious and moral belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sturgeon, N. (1988). Moral explanations. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 229–255). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Vermont (US)
- ORCID
- Cuneo, Terence
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2014-01-09
- Volume
- 171
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-443
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2019272718
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 136
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 87.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral realism, moral propositions, moral norms, moral metaphysics, moral epistemology
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