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Cited by 270Philosophical Ethics and TheoryPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics, Aesthetics, and Art

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 122 of the 136 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism

Cuneo, Terence, Shafer-Landau, Russ·2014·Philosophical Studies
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5
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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Audi, R. (2004). The good in the right. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  2. Aune, B. (1985). Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  3. Blackburn, S. (1971). Moral realism. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
  4. Blackburn, S. (1985). Errors and the phenomenology of value. Essays in quasi-realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted from Blackburn 1993).
  5. Cuneo, T. (forthcoming b). The evolutionary objection to knowing moral reasons. In D. Star (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of reasons and normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  6. FitzPatrick, W. (forthcoming b). Why there is no Darwinian dilemma for moral realism. In M. Bergman & P. Kain (Eds.), Challenges to religious and moral belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  7. Sturgeon, N. (1988). Moral explanations. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Essays on moral realism (pp. 229–255). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Metadata

Authors
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R.
Affiliations
University of Vermont (US)
ORCID
Cuneo, Terence
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2014-01-09
Volume
171
Issue
3
Pages
399-443
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
DOI
10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5
OpenAlex
W2019272718
Cited by
270
References
136
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3
FWCI
87.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
Keywords
moral realism, moral propositions, moral norms, moral metaphysics, moral epistemology

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