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Cites
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Cited by
Optional stopping: No problem for Bayesians
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‘All models are wrong...’: an introduction to model uncertainty
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Forks over knives: Predictive inconsistency in criminal justice algorithmic risk assessment tools
Greene, T., Shmueli, G., Fell, J., Lin, C.-F., & Liu, H.-W. (2022) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society · doi:10.1111/rssa.12966 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Hájek, A.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2007-03-24
- Volume
- 156
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 563-585
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2152648747
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 64.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.