Pluralistic ignorance in the bystander effect: informational dynamics of unresponsive witnesses in situations calling for intervention
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper builds a dynamic epistemic logic model of the pluralistic-ignorance explanation of the bystander effect, focusing on how ambiguous emergencies and misperceived observation can lead groups to evade despite private belief that intervention is warranted. It concludes that only the Hesitator-type model produces reasonable results, while later comparisons favor an Influenced Hesitator model over First Responder and City Dweller models but still find misfit for group size 2.
Key findings
- The formal dynamics show that a group can end in proposition-based pluralistic ignorance: all privately believe an accident occurred, but all believe others believe no accident occurred, leading all to evade. This arises from norm-based pluralistic ignorance: agents assume others are evading when they themselves are observing.
- In the smoky-room comparison, 75% of alone subjects reported smoke, rejecting the City Dweller model; the Hesitator model is also rejected because it would have individuals continuously observe. First Responder and Influenced Hesitator models score above 50%, with Influenced Hesitator at 90% correct in the confederates condition and 62% in the three-naive-subjects condition, versus First Responder at 10% and 38%.
- In the lady-in-distress comparison, 70% of alone subjects intervened, dropping to 7% with an inactive confederate; with two naive subjects, 40% of groups intervened versus an expected 91% under independence. The Influenced Hesitator model is incorrect in 60% of cases for group size 2, making it worse than a random bet there.
- The meta-study summary reports 33 face-to-face studies with an effective individual helping probability of 50% and an effective individual response rate in groups of only 22%, mostly involving groups of 2. The paper concludes subjects do not incorporate social proof by self-biased majority voting, but rather the opposite.
Methods
- The paper uses dynamic epistemic logic with multi-agent plausibility frames, action plausibility models, action-priority update products, and transition rules to model belief, higher-order belief, action, and belief change.
- It defines three agent types—First Responder, City Dweller, and Hesitator—and later an Influenced Hesitator; the main run uses three agents in a complete “all see all” network, with group-size variations.
- Model end conditions are compared to empirical studies: the smoky-room experiment (Latané and Darley, 1968), the lady-in-distress experiment (Latané and Rodin, 1969), and the meta-study (Latané and Nida, 1981). Acceptance is based on the weak requirement that a model match binary experimental end conditions in strictly more than 50% of cases.
Limitations
- The paper states that no single study was found providing suitable data for all group sizes, so comparison uses multiple studies with different experimental settings; the models are deterministic while experimental data give percentages, so data are not correctly matched.
- The paper states that no pure agent type group fits data very well, and the Influenced Hesitator model misfires for group size 2; the lady-in-distress experiment may mix social proof and diffusion of responsibility effects.
- The paper states that only the second step of the bystander-effect explanation is modeled; a complete model would also need the first step (noticing the event) and third step (assuming responsibility). The text also makes evident simplifying assumptions: complete graph network, agents given only one hypothesis about others’ types, and no full belief revision policy (a social-belief operator is introduced instead).
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
1 of 23 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingreasoning
In the actual world of S3, the agents are in a state of belief-based pluralistic ignorance with respect to A: S3 |= for all i (Bi A ∧ for all j≠i Bi Bj ¬A).
“Analogous reasoning for b and c shows that (s 0 ) S 3 is a state of pluralistic ignorance w.r.t. A.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hansen, 2011, ch. 6
Section 1.3.1.2 describes pluralistic ignorance as agents believing that others hold a belief different from their own, and the Figure 6.3 caption gives a belief-based example. Our copy does not identify S3 or establish that its actual world satisfies the stated formula; that application to S3 is not supported by this source. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents are given only one hypothesis about types, and this hypothesis is correct in the sense that the interpretation rules are (close to) the converse of the transition rules that are in fact applied.
- Findingreasoning
In the model, groups of Hesitators may end in a state of pluralistic ignorance leading to inaction.
“It is shown how groups of the latter may end in a state of pluralistic ignorance leading to inaction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The social network structure is a complete graph 'all see all'.
- The authors state this as an assumption: No agent can perform two actions simultaneously.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Doxastic programs contain the actual action.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Agent a perceives b and c during the event as forming an opinion about whether or not A.
- Findingcitation
The response time for intervention in the three naive subjects case was considerably longer than the single subject case.
“Interestingly, the response time for intervention in the three naive subjects case was considerably longer than the single subject case, indicating 1) that individuals in groups did pay heed to social proof before acting, and 2) that in many cases (38%), social proof from only two peers was not enough to preclude intervention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
- Findingreasoning
In S1, all agents consider it possible that the others consider it possible that all believe there is no accident.
“all consider it possible that the others consider it possible that all believe there is no accident.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Only 38% of the 8 groups of size 3 with three naive subjects intervened.
“but only 38% of the 8 groups did so.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
- Findingreasoning
'Simple' Hesitators will never reach an end conclusion, as they will never come to either believe there is no accident, or know that there is one.
“'Simple' Hesitators, as defined in Table 2, will never reach an end conclusion, as they will never come to either believe there is no accident, or know that there is one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
The smoky room study only compares groups of size 1 and 3, so it does not supply sufficient data to evaluate the IH model for group sizes of 2 or above 3.
“The smoky room study only compares groups of size 1 and 3, whereby it does not supply sufficient data to evaluate the IH model for group sizes of 2 or above 3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Consequently, Influenced Hesitators will choose to evade in S3 for any group size of 3 or above.
“Consequently, they will choose to evade in S 3 for any group size of 3 or above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
In the model, agents who believe an accident occurred nevertheless choose to evade due to social information dynamics.
“leading to the final state (11), where the accident in fact occurred, everybody believed so, but nevertheless chose to evade it, due to the social information dynamics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The social network structure is a complete graph 'all see all'.
- The authors state this as an assumption: No agent can perform two actions simultaneously.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Doxastic programs contain the actual action.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Agent a perceives b and c during the event as forming an opinion about whether or not A.
- The authors state this as an assumption: If you evaded, you believed there was no accident, under the assumption that you are a reasonably decent person.
- Findingown data
Of non-mixed populations, only (Influenced) Hesitator behavior varies as a function of group size.
“The second variation is group size, and it is shown that of non-mixed populations, only (Influenced) Hesitator behavior varies as a function of group size.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
With 2 confederates in the room, only 1 in 10 naive subjects intervened.
“With 2 confederates in the room, only 1 in 10 naive subjects intervened.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
- Findingreasoning
City Dwellers will evade the scene, no matter the group size.
“At the same time, City Dwellers will evade the scene, no matter the group size.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
Influenced Hesitators will intervene immediately if the group size is small enough for their private belief not to be 'overridden' by social proof.
“The 'social', or Influenced, Hesitators will however change their behavior according to group size: they will intervene immediately if the group size is small enough for their private belief not to be 'overridden' by social proof.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
In the smoky room study, of subjects that were alone, 75% reported the smoke.
“Of the subjects that were alone, 75% reported the smoke, a number high enough to warrant the rejection of the City Dweller model, which would have it that all evade.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
- Findingreasoning
For any group size, First Responders will intervene in S2, immediately following the accident.
“In words, for any group size, First Responders will intervene in S 2 , i.e. immediately following the accident.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Only the Hesitator model produces reasonable results when compared to empirical studies.
“It is concluded that only the Hesitator model produces reasonable results.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction: The Bystander Effect and Pluralistic Ignorance · plain
“It is concluded that the Hesitator model is the only of the three producing reasonable results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The social network structure is a complete graph 'all see all'.
- The authors state this as an assumption: No agent can perform two actions simultaneously.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Doxastic programs contain the actual action.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Agent a perceives b and c during the event as forming an opinion about whether or not A.
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction: The Bystander Effect and Pluralistic Ignorance · plain
- Findingreasoning
At group size 2, Influenced Hesitators still decide to intervene because they use their own belief to break the tie between what they perceive as an even split on whether an accident is happening.
“At group size 2 these agents still decide to intervene because they use their own belief to break the tie between what they perceive as an even split on whether an accident is happening.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
No pure agent type group fits the data very well.
“As no pure agent type group fits data very well, two possibilities are worth investigating.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
In the lady in distress experiment, the accident is ambiguous between either a serious accident or a not-so-serious one.
“Contrary to the smoky room, this accident is ambiguous between either a serious accident (e.g.broken leg) or a not-so-serious one (weakly sprained ankle).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Rodin, 1969 source
- Findingcitation
Most of the studies in the meta-study involved groups of 2.
“Most of these studies involved groups of 2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Nida, 1981 source
- Premisecitation
As the number of witnesses increases, the chance of help being offered diminishes.
“The collected data shows a robust tendency, namely that the chance of help being offered diminishes as the number of witnesses increases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Nida (1981) source
- Interpretationreasoning
Upon incorporating social proof, all agents socially believe, contrary to their private beliefs, that no accident occurred.
“That is, upon incorporating social proof, all agents 'socially believe', contrary to their private beliefs, that no accident occurred.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Individuals in groups did pay heed to social proof before acting.
“Interestingly, the response time for intervention in the three naive subjects case was considerably longer than the single subject case, indicating 1) that individuals in groups did pay heed to social proof before acting, and 2) that in many cases (38%), social proof from only two peers was not enough to preclude intervention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In many cases (38%), social proof from only two peers was not enough to preclude intervention.
“Interestingly, the response time for intervention in the three naive subjects case was considerably longer than the single subject case, indicating 1) that individuals in groups did pay heed to social proof before acting, and 2) that in many cases (38%), social proof from only two peers was not enough to preclude intervention.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The Hesitator model is rejected because it would have it that individuals would continuously observe instead of completing their questionnaires.
“Likewise, the Hesitator model is rejected, as it would have it that individuals would continuously observe (instead of completing their questionnaires).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Had EPM E1i been defined so that agents considered observation more plausible than evasion, this state of pluralistic ignorance would not have arisen.
“Again, importantly, had EPM E 1i been defined so that agents considered observation more plausible than evasion, this state of pluralistic ignorance would not have arisen.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The wrong beliefs obtained by interpretation rules are a direct consequence of the mis-perception of actions occurring in E1.
“This is a direct consequence of the mis-perception of actions occurring in E 1 .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.
- Interpretationreasoning
Hereby, informational dynamics leading to an observable bystander effect has been modeled.
“Hereby, informational dynamics leading to an observable bystander effect has been modeled.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Most emergencies are, or at least begin as, ambiguous events.
“[m]ost emergencies are, or at least begin as, ambiguous events”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
- Interpretationreasoning
If individuals acted independently, with a 75% alone intervention rate, 98% of groups of size 3 with three naive subjects would be expected to intervene.
“With 75% of individuals intervening when alone, it should be expected that 98% of groups of size 3 with three naive subjects would intervene if individuals acted independently,foot_22”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
When we see others observe, we consider it plausible that they chose to evade.
“though we ourselves may choose to observe, when we see others do the same, we consider it plausible that they in fact chose to evade.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Subjects do not incorporate social proof by self-biased majority voting, but rather the opposite.
“-Subjects do not incorporate social proof by self-biased majority voting, but rather the opposite.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Proposition-based pluralistic ignorance arises due to norm-based pluralistic ignorance: that all agents assume others are evading when they themselves are observing is a necessary condition for the state of proposition-based pluralistic ignorance to arise.
“-Proposition-based pluralistic ignorance arises due to norm-based pluralistic ignorance: that all agents assume others are evading when they themselves are observing is a necessary condition for the state of proposition-based pluralistic ignorance to arise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The IH model misfires for groups of size 2.
“These percentages strongly contradict the IH model for group size 2, as the expectation is that neither of the two agents would be sufficiently influenced by each other to not act on their private beliefs.Both would therefore intervene following observation.”
- Also stated in: § Is One Additional Witness Enough for Intervention Inhibition? · hedged
“Hence, it seems that the model misfires when it comes to groups of size 2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Is One Additional Witness Enough for Intervention Inhibition? · hedged
- Premisecitation
Proietti and Olsson (2013) show how a state of pluralistic ignorance may be dissolved by a series of announcements of private beliefs heard by matrix neighbors.
“Of formal studies, Proietti and Olsson (2013) show how a state of pluralistic ignorance state may be dissolved by a series of announcements of private beliefs heard by matrix neighbors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Proietti and Olsson (2013) source
- Premisecitation
The meta-study of Latané and Nida (1981) strongly indicates that determining social influence occurs in groups of size 2.
“The meta-study (Latané and Nida, 1981) strongly indicates that determining social influence occurs in groups of size 2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Nida, 1981 source
- Premisecitation
In the study of Schroeder and Prentice (1998), information on the subject diminished alcohol consumption among college students.
“in the study of Schroeder and Prentice (1998), information on the subject diminished the alcohol consumption among college students.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schroeder and Prentice (1998) source
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 22
- May combine two claims. 27
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningGiven S1 with H1 ∪ H2 ∪ H3 as rules over E1, the system dictates the Type IV program with σ0 = OOO as the next APM choice.
“Given the above, the system based on S 1 with H 1 ∪ H 2 ∪ H 3 as rules over E 1 dictates the type IV program with σ 0 = OOO as next APM choice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe First Responder model is 10% correct in the confederates condition and 38% in the naive group condition, falling below the 50% mark.
“The First Responder model is 10% correct in the confederates condition 31 and 38% in the naive group condition, hereby falling below the 50% mark.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingnone givenNo single study has been found that provides suitable data for all group sizes on the effect of social proof on the perception of the accident.
“Alas, no one such has been found that provides suitable data for all group sizes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe Influenced Hesitators model is 90% correct in the confederates condition and 62% correct in the naive group condition, and fairs better than 50% overall.
“The Influence Hesitators model does better: it is 90% correct of the confederates condition 32 and 62% correct in the naive group condition.Hence, it fairs better than 50% overall.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningApplying social belief to A in S3, S3 |= for all i SB_i|A ¬A.
“Applying the notion of social belief to A in S 3 , it is easily seen that S 3 |= i∈A SB i|A ¬A.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn S1, for all i ∈ {0, ..., 7}, (s0, σi) ∈ A^{S1}, and (s, τi) ∈ (¬A).
“In S 1 , for all i ∈ {0, ..., 7}, (s 0 , σ i ) ∈ A S 1 , and (s, τ i ) ∈ (¬A)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
FindingreasoningFirst Responders will again intervene.
“First Responders will again intervene”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenFor non-mixed groups, both City Dwellers and (Influenced) Hesitators will produce the observable bystander effect.
“The first change is of agent types, where it is seen that for non-mixed groups, both City Dwellers and (Influenced) Hesitators will produce the observable bystander effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe actual world in the ensuing EPM S4, the final step of the model, satisfies A ∧ for all i Bi A ∧ for all i SB_i|G ¬A ∧ for all i Ei.
“The actual world in the ensuing EPM S 4 , the final step of the model, will then satisfy A ∧ i∈A B i A ∧ i∈A SB i|G ¬A ∧ i∈A E i .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn the lady in distress experiment, in the first condition, 70% of the alone subjects intervened, with a strong drop to 7% when an inactive confederate was introduced.
“In the first condition, 70% of the alone subjects intervened, with a strong drop to 7% when an inactive confederate was introduced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Rodin, 1969 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningIf a, b and c are Influenced, the unique next APM choice will be the Type IV program with σ0 = EEE.
“More precisely, if a, b and c are Influenced, the unique next APM choice will be the Type IV program with σ 0 = EEE.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningUpdating S0 with E0 produces S1 in which every agent believes that an accident (A) has occurred, though no one knows A.
“In summary, every agent believes that A: an accident has occurred (though no-one knows)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
FindingreasoningHesitators will again, irrespective of social proof, choose to observe.
“Hesitators will again, irrespective of social proof, choose to observe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
FindingreasoningCity Dwellers will again choose to evade.
“City Dwellers will again choose to evade”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
FindingreasoningEvery agent chooses to observe.
“That is, every agent chooses to observe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningBy application of interpretation rules, agents establish beliefs about each others' previous beliefs, but even though the applied interpretation rules were correct, the obtained beliefs are wrong: S1 |= Bb A, but S3 |= Ba [S1]Bb ¬A.
“By application of interpretation rules, agents establish beliefs about each others previous beliefs, but even though the applied interpretation rules were correct, the obtained beliefs are wrong: S 1 |= B b A, but S 3 |= B a [S 1 ]B b ¬A.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents are given only one hypothesis about types, and this hypothesis is correct in the sense that the interpretation rules are (close to) the converse of the transition rules that are in fact applied.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenNone of the three agent types introduced so far will change their action if presented again prompted to intervene, observe or evade.
“Notice that none of the three agent types introduced so far will change their action if presented again prompted to intervene, observe or evade.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn S1, all agents know that their peers either believe or disbelieve A; none are indifferent between A and ¬A states.
“all know that their peers either believe or disbelieve A (none are indifferent between A and ¬A states)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationWith two naive subjects, 91% of groups would be expected to intervene if subjects acted independently, whereas only 40% of such groups in fact did so.
“With two naive subjects, 91% of groups would be expected to intervene if subjects acted independently, whereas only 40% of such groups in fact did so.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Rodin, 1969 source
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataBoth the First Responder and Influenced Hesitator models score better than 50% on the smoky room data.
“Both the First Responder and Influenced Hesitator models score better than 50%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe IH model is incorrect in 60% of cases for group size 2, making it worse than a random bet.
“This makes the model incorrect in 60% of cases, making it worse than a random bet.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe model with others-biased social beliefs does not fair very well on the data from the smoky room and lady in distress studies, but it does at least do better than a random bet.
“Though this model does not fair very well on the data from the smoky room and lady in distress studies, it does at least do better than a random bet.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationSummarizing 33 studies with face-to-face interaction, the effective individual probability of helping was 50%, with an effective individual response rate in groups only 22%.
“Summarizing 33 studies with face-to-face interaction, the effective individual probability of helping was 50%, with an effective individual response rate in groups only 22%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Nida, 1981 source
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningChanging the social beliefs definition to one favoring the perceived beliefs of the other would yield a better model for the 2 subject case, while it would not alter the results for the group size 3 case.
“Changing this to one favoring the perceived beliefs of the other would yield a better model for the 2 subject case, while it would not alter the results for the group size 3 case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIf other bystanders are not showing signs of distress, the event will be perceived as less critical and ultimately bypassed.
“if other bystanders are not showing signs of distress, the event will be perceived as less critical and therefore ultimately bypassed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1970
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe presented sequence of models, transition rules and updates conjoined captures important informational aspects of the observable bystander effect, given that the model is accepted.
“The presented sequence of models, transition rules and updates conjoined captures important informational aspects of the observable bystander effect, given that the model is accepted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn a group, the responsibility to intervene is distributed among all, diminishing the chances that anyone will act.
“When alone, the responsibility to intervene rests on one individual, but when in a group, the same pressure is apparently distributed among all, thereby diminishing the chances that anyone will act.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1970
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPluralistic ignorance has been put forth as a decisive factor in various social situations.
“Pluralistic ignorance has been put forth as a decisive factor in a plethora of social situations”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningIf the group size is 3 or above, Influenced Hesitators will conclude, by the mis-perception of others' choice to observe as an act of evasion and the resulting state of pluralistic ignorance, that enough agents believe that no accident occurred for themselves to be 'socially convinced' that this is the case.
“If the group size is 3 or above, Influenced Hesitators will conclude, by the mis-perception of others' choice to observe as an act of evasion and the resulting state of pluralistic ignorance, that enough agents believe that no accident occurred for themselves to be 'socially convinced' that this is the case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe Type IV program with actual state OOO reflects an implicit norm-based pluralistic ignorance: though every agent is observing, each perceives the situation as one where they are the only ones doing it.
“Interestingly, the Type IV program with actual state OOO reflects an implicit norm-based pluralistic ignorance: though every agent is observing, each perceive the situation as one where they are the only ones doing it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPluralistic ignorance occurs on corporate boards, often resulting in poor strategic decisions.
“Though a fictitious example, pluralistic ignorance does occur on corporate boards, often resulting in poor strategic decisions (see (Westphal and Bednar, 2005)).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Westphal and Bednar, 2005 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe City Dweller model is rejected because it would have it that all evade, contradicting the 75% reporting rate among alone subjects.
“Of the subjects that were alone, 75% reported the smoke, a number high enough to warrant the rejection of the City Dweller model, which would have it that all evade.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe actions of First Responders, City Dwellers, and 'Simple' Hesitators are invariant over group size, due to their inherently non-social decision rules.
“That all these three agent types' actions are invariant over group size is due to their inherently non-social decision rules.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe latter captures the post-factual effects of the mentioned norm-based pluralistic ignorance of ΓIV: all agents have the belief that they individually were the only ones to observe, while all others evaded.
“The latter captures the post-factual effects of the mentioned norm-based pluralistic ignorance of Γ IV : all have the belief that they individually were the only ones to observe, while all others evaded.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningHad EPM E1i been such that agents perceived actions according to their own decision rules, i.e. found observation more plausible than evasion in others, all would have correct beliefs about the actions of others.
“Importantly, had EPM E 1i on page 15 been such that agents perceived actions according to their own decision rules, i.e. found observation more plausible than evasion in others, all would have correct beliefs about the actions of others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe classic 'smoky room' experiment of Latané and Darley (1968) provides data which allows the rejection of three of the four models (First Responder, City Dweller, and Hesitator).
“The classic 'smoky room' experiment of (Latané and Darley, 1968), specifically designed to test the hypothesis of the second step of the explanation of the bystander effect (see p. 2), has served as a strong guide for the construction of the models, and provides data which allows the rejection of three of them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe presented models are deterministic, while experimental data provides information about the percentage of individuals who intervene, so data will not be correctly matched.
“Inherently, the presented models are deterministic, while experimental data provides information about the percentage of individuals who intervene.Given this, data will not be correctly matched.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe obvious parameter to tweak for a better fit is the self-biased majority voting definition of social beliefs, which does not put enough weight on the other in the 2 person case.
“The obvious parameter to tweak for a better fit is the self-biased majority voting definition of social beliefs, which does not put enough weight on the other in the 2 person case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn the smoky room study, the experimenters assumed that no diffusion of responsibility arose because the possible accident would have dire consequences for the subjects themselves.
“As the possible accident will have dire consequences for the subjects themselves, the experimenters assumed that no diffusion of responsibility arose.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Latané and Darley, 1968 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThat not all subjects chose to intervene in the single agent case seems to indicate that at least some behave as City Dwellers; that some chose to intervene in the three agent case indicates that some act as First Responders.
“That not all subjects chose to intervene in the single agent case seems to indicate that at least some behave as City Dwellers; that some chose to intervene in the three agent case indicates that some act as First Responders.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe sub-optimal choice for all to evade is a direct result of considering social proof in a state of proposition-based pluralistic ignorance: Influenced Hesitators with correct beliefs about their peers beliefs would choose to intervene.
“-The sub-optimal choice for all to evade is a direct result of considering social proof in a state of proposition-based pluralistic ignorance: Influenced Hesitators with correct beliefs about their peers beliefs would choose to intervene.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe IH model may misfire because the lady in distress experiment does not conform to the pluralistic ignorance explanation of the bystander effect; specifically, it does not preclude a mix of social proof and diffusion of responsibility effects, given that the accident did not put the subjects in faked danger.
“Partly, the model may misfire as the experiment does not conform to the pluralistic ignorance explanation of the bystander effect.Specifically, the experiment does not preclude the possibility of a mix of social proof and diffusion of responsibility effects, given that the accident in question did not put the subjects in faked danger.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe sub-optimal choice for all to evade is not a consequence of 'apathetic' agents: City Dweller evasion is not influenced by group size.
“-The sub-optimal choice for all to evade is not a consequence of”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
The social network structure is a complete graph 'all see all'.
“Throughout, the same complete graph 'all see all' social network structure is assumed.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
No agent can perform two actions simultaneously.
“It is assumed that no agent can perform two actions simultaneously”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Doxastic programs contain the actual action.
“it will be assumed that doxastic programs contain the actual action.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Agent a perceives b and c during the event as forming an opinion about whether or not A.
“It is assumed, though, that a perceives b and c during the event as forming an opinion about whether or not A.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
If you evaded, you believed there was no accident, under the assumption that you are a reasonably decent person.
“Under the assumption that you are a reasonably decent person, only that you believed there was none.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
b and c perceive the accident in an identical manner.
“Assuming that b and c perceive the accident in an identical manner”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.
“It is assumed that agents find it more plausible that others evade than that they observe.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Agents are given only one hypothesis about types, and this hypothesis is correct in the sense that the interpretation rules are (close to) the converse of the transition rules that are in fact applied.
“To simplify, agents are given only one hypothesis about types, the hypothesis also being correct in the sense that the interpretation rules are (close to) the converse of the transition rules that are in fact applied.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The individual modeling steps are reasonable explications of the reasoning steps occurring in bystander effect-like scenarios.
“Accepting the individual modeling steps as reasonable explications of the reasoning steps occurring in bystander effect-like scenarios, the constructed dynamics allows for a number of conclusions about such phenomena:”
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Dynamic Epistemic Logics of Diffusion and Prediction in Social Networks
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BackgroundDynamic term-modal logics for first-order epistemic planning
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“In some cases, responsibility diffusion may be caused by an individual's sincere belief that others are better prepared to take action within a given situation (Rendsvig, 2014).”
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“These bubbles may push collectives of people – sometimes even computers – in the same (often) jinxed direction; (a) thinking the same thing; (b) acting in the same apathetic way when they witness somebody in distress online (Hendricks 2014b) or offline (Rendsvig 2014); (c) holding the same polarized opinions in politi…”
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“2014; Rendsvig 2014).”
Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief in Flux
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BackgroundSelf-citationConvergence, continuity, recurrence and Turing completeness in dynamic epistemic logic1
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“Rendsvig (2014) explained that it is because individuals tend to hold themselves back from reacting to ambiguous situation and waiting for further information about it.”
BackgroundLeugnung und Ablehnung von Verantwortung
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Dynamic Term-Modal Logics for Epistemic Planning.Preprint
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“Pluralistic ignorance, i.e., “if no one else believes there is cause for alarm, then no intervention is necessary” (Rendsvig, 2014, p. 2490) , has been found to influence indifferent bystander behavior.”
Beş Yıldızlı Otel İşletmelerinde Korku Kültürünün İzleyici Etkisi Üzerindeki Rolü
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“…et al. ( 2011 ) and Zhen and Seligman ( 2011 ), focused on how influence, such as peer pressure, affects knowledge and preferences, while later studies refined the notion of social influence to model pluralistic ignorance (Christoff & Hansen, 2013, 2015 ; Rendsvig, 2014 ; Christoff et al., 2016 ).”
Josupeit, C. (2026) · Cyberpsychology Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace · doi:10.5817/cp2026-4-14
- Authors
- Rendsvig, R. K.
- Affiliations
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Rendsvig, Rasmus K.
- ORCID
- Rendsvig, Rasmus K.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2014-04-08
- Volume
- 191
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 2471-2498
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W1964093878
- Semantic Scholar
- 3ef6db86d84ded0b43ed782f8248c8f690719f48
- Cited by
- 32
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 1.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Ocean Engineering › Evacuation and Crowd Dynamics
- Keywords
- bystander effect, pluralistic ignorance, social validation, inaction, intervention decisions, dynamic epistemic logic, agent types, first responders, urban residents
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