Does illusionism imply skepticism of animal consciousness?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Illusionism about consciousness entails that phenomenal consciousness doesn’t exist. The distribution question concerns the distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom. Skepticism of animal consciousness is the view that few or no kinds of animals possess consciousness. Thus, illusionism seems to imply a skeptical view on the distribution question. However, I argue that illusionism and skepticism of animal consciousness are actually orthogonal to each other. If illusionism is true, then phenomenal consciousness does not ground intrinsic value so that the non-existence of phenomenal consciousness would not have ethical implications. In this case, the adequate reaction is to reformulate the distribution question in terms of the quasi-phenomenal functional features associated with the illusion of phenomenal consciousness which do ground intrinsic value. Hence, either illusionism is false or the distribution question does not concern phenomenal consciousness. In any case, illusionism does not directly tell us anything about the distribution question. However, since illusionism forces us to revise our traditional conception of consciousness, it indirectly affects research on animal consciousness by questioning that consciousness is a unified and an all-or-nothing property.
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Cites
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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
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Background
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
How to deal with risks of AI suffering
Dung, L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2238287 · Cited by 21
Self-citationBirch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Dung, L.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2022-05-27
- Volume
- 200
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W4282000522
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 6.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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