Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
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“The enactive approach to mind-brain considers cognition, emotion, and body functions as parts of an integrated system at neurobiological, psychological, and phenomenological domains (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009).”
From Mindfulness and Emotion Regulation: Insights from Neurobiological, Psychological, and Clinical Studies (2017) · cites this paper as Thompson and Stapleton, 2009
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Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Toronto (CA)
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Thompson, Evan
- Stapleton, Mog
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-20
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-30
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W1989248721
- Cited by
- 501
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 50 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 3.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- osf.io
- Licence
- public-domain
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/E511139/1)
- European Social Fund
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- enactive cognition, extended mind, sensemaking, autonomy, internalism and externalism, emotion and cognition, incorporation, embodied cognition
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