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The Natural Origins of Content
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Cites
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Cited by
Representation in Cognitive Science
Shea, N. (2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198812883.001.0001 · Cited by 676
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Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001213 · Cited by 348
Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6 · Cited by 278
From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1578-6 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- Hutto, D. D., & Satne, G.
- Venue
- Philosophia
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 521-536
- ISSN
- 0048-3893 (ISSN-L)
- 1574-9274
- OpenAlex
- W2262489537
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 25.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
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