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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Natural Origins of Content

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Hutto, Daniel D., Satne, Glenda · 2015 · Philosophia

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Citations

Cites

Show all 7 references

Research works printed but not linked: 36

  1. Burge, T. (2010). The origins of objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
  2. Cash, M. (2008). The normativity problem: Evolution and naturalized semantics. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 29(1–2), 99–138.
  3. Clapin, H. (Ed.). (2002). The philosophy of mental representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  4. Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon.
  5. Dennett, D. C. (1985). Brainstorms. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  6. Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  7. Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. · DOI · Paper page
  8. Fodor, J. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  9. Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
  10. Fodor, J. A., & Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (2010). What Darwin got wrong. London: Profile Books.
  11. Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2015). Minds without meanings: An essay on the content of concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  12. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Mental representation, naturalism and teleosemantics. In G. Macdonald & D. Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics (pp. 42–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI
  13. Haugeland, J. (1990). The intentionality all-stars. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 383–427. · DOI
  14. Haugeland, J. (1993). Pattern and being. In B. Dahlbom (Ed.), Dennett and his critics (pp. 52–69). Oxford: Blackwell.
  15. Haugeland, J. (1998). Truth and rule-following. In Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind (pp. 305–361). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  16. Hutto, D. (2008). Folk-psychological narratives. The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  17. Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  18. Machery, E. (2011). A better philosophy for a better psychology: Comment on Slaney and Racine. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 31(2), 90–95. · doi:10.1037/a0023411
  19. McGinn, C. (1989). Mental content. Oxford: Blackwell.
  20. McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, value and reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  21. Millikan, R. G. (1993). White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Cambridge: MIT Press. · DOI · Paper page
  22. Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod lectures. Cambridge: MIT Press. · DOI · Paper page
  23. Millikan, R. G. (2005). Language: A biological model. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
  24. Papineau, D. (1987). Reality and representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  25. Prinz, J. (2004). Gut reactions. A perceptual theory of emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  26. Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  27. Quine, W. V. O. (1995). From stimulus to science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. · doi:10.4159/9780674042476
  28. Rakoczy, H., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). The sources of normativity: young children’s awareness of the normative structure of games. Developmental Psychology, 44(3), 875–881. · DOI · Paper page
  29. Ritchie, J. (2008). Understanding naturalism. Stocksfield: Acumen. · doi:10.1017/upo9781844653850
  30. Rosenberg, A. (2013). How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to anti-Darwinsism, and how we can avoid the same fate. European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 3, 1–17. · DOI
  31. Rupert, R. (2011). Embodiment, consciousness, and the massively representational mind. Philosophical Topics, 39(1), 99–120. · DOI
  32. Shea, N. (2013). Naturalising representational content. Philosophy Compass, 8(5), 496–509. · DOI
  33. Stalnaker, R. C. (1987). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  34. Sterelny, K. (2012). The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge: MIT Press. · DOI · Paper page
  35. Stich, S. 1990. The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  36. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Hutto, D. D., & Satne, G.
Venue
Philosophia
Published
2015-09
Volume
43
Issue
3
Pages
521-536
ISSN
  • 0048-3893 (ISSN-L)
  • 1574-9274
OpenAlex
W2262489537
Cited by
190
References
7
FWCI
25.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Natural Origins of Content. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11406-015-9644-0
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Hutto, D. D., & Satne, G. (2015). The Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9644-0

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