From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Orne, M. T. (1962) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0043424 · Cited by 4,041 · cited 1×
“…neurophenomenological approach emphasizes the pragmatic requirement of having recourse to specific methodologies to tackle well-known methodological difficulties associated with first-person reports—such as response biases and the influence of demand characteristics; see for example, Orne (1962).”
BackgroundThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262529365.001.0001 · Cited by 2,449
Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0036681 · Cited by 2,196
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2007) · doi:10.4324/9780203086599 · Cited by 1,512 · cited 1×
“Phenomenology is the descriptive study of conscious experience, its structure, its flow, and its dynamics (Husserl 1973; Dastur 1995; Moran 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi 2020).”
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Cited by 1,164 · cited 1×
“Of note is that the present approach and target of explanation should be thought of as distinct from the target of explanation in other, closely related research on the neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., Mashour et al. 2020).”
ResultGranger causality analysis in neuroscience and neuroimaging
Seth, A. K., Barrett, A. B., & Barnett, L. (2015) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4399-14.2015 · Cited by 928 · cited 1×
“However, of late, there has been significant interest, not to mention advances, in our ability to infer causal relations from data (Pearl 2018; Seth et al. 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationVision as Bayesian inference: analysis by synthesis?
Yuille, A., & Kersten, D. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.002 · Cited by 849
Ten simple rules for dynamic causal modeling
Stephan, K. E., Penny, W. D., Moran, R. J., den Ouden, H. E. M., Daunizeau, J., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.11.015 · Cited by 803 · cited 1×
“Generative modelling of this sort is a corner-stone of computational neuroscience (Stephan et al. 2010) and is being applied increasingly to domains outside the purview of neurobiology; e.g., to model the spread of the COVID-19 virus (e.g., Friston et al. 2020).”
MethodSelf-citation
Cited by
The search for the neural correlate of consciousness: Progress and challenges
Lepauvre, A., & Melloni, L. (2021) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2021.87 · Cited by 38
“These are crucial questions; andwhile some of themhave been addressed by Antoine Lutz with his concept of generative passages (Lutz, 2002), and newer ideas have been proposed in line with a computational approach to neurophenomenology (Ramstead et al., 2021), there remains much more to be done.”
BackgroundActive inference as a computational framework for consciousness
Vilas, M. G., Auksztulewicz, R., & Melloni, L. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00579-w · Cited by 28
“Recently, Ramstead et al. (2021) have proposed an account termed computational phenomenology based on linking phenomenological data with computational generative models of experience in an attempt to formally describe the structure of consciousness.”
BackgroundA beautiful loop: An active inference theory of consciousness.
Laukkonen, R., Friston, K., & Chandaria, S. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106296 · Cited by 45
“One way to pursue this is through what we term hyper-generative models, or hyper-models for short (Friston, 2010; Parr and Friston, 2018; Ramstead et al., 2022).”
Self-citationEditorial: Predictive Processing and Consciousness
Miller, M., Clark, A., & Schlicht, T. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6 · Cited by 8
Da Costa, L., Seth, A. K., Friston, K., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Sandved-Smith, L. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag026 · Cited by 3
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ramstead, M. J. D., Seth, A. K., Hesp, C., Sandved-Smith, L., Mago, J., Lifshitz, M., Pagnoni, G., Smith, R., Dumas, G., Lutz, A., Friston, K., & Constant, A.
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2022-03-18
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 829-857
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W4221015635
- Cited by
- 84
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 13.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13164-021-00604-y
- The paper
- Ramstead, M. J. D., Seth, A. K., Hesp, C., Sandved-Smith, L., Mago, J., Lifshitz, M., Pagnoni, G., Smith, R., Dumas, G., Lutz, A., Friston, K., & Constant, A. (2022). From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00604-y
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.