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Fine-tuning in the context of Bayesian theory testing

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Barnes, Luke A. · 2018 · European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Cited by 21

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Fine-tuning in physics and cosmology is often used as evidence that a theory is incomplete. For example, the parameters of the standard model of particle physics are “unnaturally” small (in various technical senses), which has driven much of the search for physics beyond the standard model. Of particular interest is the fine-tuning of the universe for life, which suggests that our universe’s ability to create physical life forms is improbable and in need of explanation, perhaps by a multiverse. This claim has been challenged on the grounds that the relevant probability measure cannot be justified because it cannot be normalized, and so small probabilities cannot be inferred. We show how fine-tuning can be formulated within the context of Bayesian theory testing (or model selection) in the physical sciences. The normalizability problem is seen to be a general problem for testing any theory with free parameters, and not a unique problem for fine-tuning. Physical theories in fact avoid such problems in one of two ways. Dimensional parameters are bounded by the Planck scale, avoiding troublesome infinities, and we are not compelled to assume that dimensionless parameters are distributed uniformly, which avoids non-normalizability.

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Research works printed but not linked: 24

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Metadata

Authors
Barnes, L. A.
Venue
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Published
2017-08-04
Volume
8
Issue
2
Pages
253-269
ISSN
  • 1879-4912 (ISSN-L)
  • 1879-4920
OpenAlex
W2734449850
Cited by
21
References
12
FWCI
6.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Funders
John Templeton Foundation (55268)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fine-tuning in the context of Bayesian theory testing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13194-017-0184-2
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Barnes, L. A. (2018). Fine-tuning in the context of Bayesian theory testing. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0184-2

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