David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.
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Citations
Cites
New work for a theory of universals
Lewis, D. (1983) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408312341131 · Cited by 3,140
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Lewis, D. (1980) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14 · Cited by 799
Tooley, M. (1977) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1977.10716190 · Cited by 681
Carroll, J. W. (1994) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619908 · Cited by 314
Loewer, B. (2001) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/s1355-2198(01)00028-4 · Cited by 286
Self-citationLoewer, B., & University of Arkansas Press (1996) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics199624112 · Cited by 234
Self-citation
Cited by
Loewer, B. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9911-x · Cited by 324
Self-citationMiller, E. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0351-7 · Cited by 125
Schaffer, J. (2007) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axm002 · Cited by 104
An objective counterfactual theory of information
Cohen, J., & Meskin, A. (2006) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400600895821 · Cited by 63
The package deal account of laws and properties (PDA)
Loewer, B. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02765-2 · Cited by 55
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Metadata
- Authors
- Loewer, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-12
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1115-1125
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2126513944
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 28.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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