Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
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“The influence of information on agent behavior is well-established through two mechanisms.First, agents make decisions under uncertainty, and information affects belief updates via Bayesian updating [32].Second, information enables social learning, where agents adopt observed successful strategies [28,29].”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [32]
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“Necessary and sufficient conditions for reaching a consensus in this model are presented in [51].”
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MethodWord-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
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“4.1, where each individual updates her beliefs as a weighted average of the beliefs of her social neighbors, with weights given by the “trust” she has for those neighbors (see also [30–32]).”
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Robinson, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969530 · Cited by 868
The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks
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BackgroundResultBayesian Learning in Social Networks
Acemoglu, D., Dahleh, M. A., Lobel, I., & Ozdaglar, A. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr004 · Cited by 754
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Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
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“Much of it, however, takes place through a process of “social learning,” whereby individuals obtain information and update their beliefs and opinions as a result of their own experiences, their observations of others’ actions and experiences, the communication with others about their beliefs and…”
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Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds
Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2010) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.2.1.112 · Cited by 979
A tutorial on modeling and analysis of dynamic social networks. Part I
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Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., & Ozdaglar, A.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ozdaglar, Asuman
- ORCID
- Ozdaglar, Asuman
- Venue
- Dynamic Games and Applications
- Published
- 2010-10-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-49
- ISSN
- 2153-0785 (ISSN-L)
- 2153-0793
- OpenAlex
- W3122266916
- Cited by
- 705
- References
- 85
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 57 · 2016: 63 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 51 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 13.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Dynamic Games and Applications (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Keywords
- opinion dynamics, belief dynamics, social learning, Bayesian learning, non-Bayesian learning, social networks, consensus, information aggregation, misinformation, belief manipulation, media influence, political influence
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.