The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap
Open accessAbstract
In a landmark essay, Andreas Matthias claimed that current developments in autonomous, artificially intelligent (AI) systems are creating a so-called responsibility gap, which is allegedly ever-widening and stands to undermine both the moral and legal frameworks of our society. But how severe is the threat posed by emerging technologies? In fact, a great number of authors have indicated that the fear is thoroughly instilled. The most pessimistic are calling for a drastic scaling-back or complete moratorium on AI systems, while the optimists aim to show that the gap can be bridged nonetheless. Contrary to both camps, I argue against the prevailing assumption that there is a technology-based responsibility gap. I show how moral responsibility is a dynamic and flexible process, one that can effectively encompass emerging technological entities.
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Cites
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“Consider also those who argue for cognitive enhancement via external objects (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Kirsh 2010; Heersmink 2017). possible to hold anyone else responsible ” (Sparrow 2007, p. 65).”
BackgroundResponsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249 · cited 1×
“As I have maintained, moral responsibility is not the same as accountability via regulation — and Matthias (2004) explicitly recognized this by introducing his discussion with reference to Strawson ’ s reactive attitudes and theories of moral responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Oshana 2002).”
BackgroundImplementing Machine Learning in Health Care — Addressing Ethical Challenges
Char, D. S., Shah, N. H., & Magnus, D. (2018) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmp1714229 · Cited by 1,857
The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata
Matthias, A. (2004) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1 · Cited by 1,101 · cited 7×
“In a paper posing the question of “ Technologically blurred accountability?, ” Sebastian Köhler, Neil Roughley, and Hanno Sauer (2017) directly address the problem raised by Matthias (2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialHow AI can be a force for good
Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aat5991 · Cited by 760
Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2009) · Oxford University Press · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374049.001.0001 · Cited by 711 · cited 2×
“Even granting that technology can reflect human values — or that AI can possess something like “ functional morality ” (Allen and Wallach 2009, 2011) — surely the most intelligent machines cannot truly be said to care .”
BackgroundSPARROW, R. (2007) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346.x · Cited by 593 · cited 1×
“Consider also those who argue for cognitive enhancement via external objects (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Kirsh 2010; Heersmink 2017). possible to hold anyone else responsible ” (Sparrow 2007, p. 65).”
Thinking with external representations
Kirsh, D. (2010) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-010-0272-8 · Cited by 525
The threat of algocracy: reality, resistance and accommodation
Danaher, J. (2016) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-015-0211-1 · Cited by 519
A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI
Wachter, S., & Mittelstadt, B. (2018) · doi:10.31228/osf.io/mu2kf · Cited by 463
Cited by
Legal and Ethical Consideration in Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Who Takes Responsibility?
Naik, N., Hameed, B. M. Z., Shetty, D. K., Swain, D., Shah, M., Paul, R., Aggarwal, K., Ibrahim, S., Patil, V., Smriti, K., et al. (2022) · Frontiers in Surgery · doi:10.3389/fsurg.2022.862322 · Cited by 931
Artificial intelligence in medicine and the disclosure of risks
Kiener, M. (2021) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01085-w · Cited by 97
Responsible AI and moral responsibility: a common appreciation
Tigard, D. W. (2021) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-020-00009-0 · Cited by 56
Self-citationHuman Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Popa, E. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00483-2 · Cited by 45
Reactive Attitudes and AI-Agents – Making Sense of Responsibility and Control Gaps
Rebera, A. P. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00808-x · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Tigard, D. W.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2020-07-09
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 589-607
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W3040902286
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 22.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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