There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In a landmark essay, Andreas Matthias claimed that current developments in autonomous, artificially intelligent (AI) systems are creating a so-called responsibility gap, which is allegedly ever-widening and stands to undermine both the moral and legal frameworks of our society. But how severe is the threat posed by emerging technologies? In fact, a great number of authors have indicated that the fear is thoroughly instilled. The most pessimistic are calling for a drastic scaling-back or complete moratorium on AI systems, while the optimists aim to show that the gap can be bridged nonetheless. Contrary to both camps, I argue against the prevailing assumption that there is a technology-based responsibility gap. I show how moral responsibility is a dynamic and flexible process, one that can effectively encompass emerging technological entities.
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Citations
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Background
Cited by
Legal and Ethical Consideration in Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Who Takes Responsibility?
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Responsible AI and moral responsibility: a common appreciation
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Self-citationHuman Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence (AI)
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“Against these debates, Tigard (2020) contests the responsibility gap, arguing for a more dynamic understanding of moral responsibility, that would accommodate cases of AI behavior: “the techno-optimists and the techno-pessimists appear to agree upon a fundamental premise, namely that technology…”
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Rebera, A. P. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00808-x · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Tigard, D. W.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2020-07-09
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 589-607
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W3040902286
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 65
- FWCI
- 22.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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