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Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case

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Gubelmann, Reto · 2024 · Philosophy & Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Burge, T. (2010). Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
  2. Kant, I. (2012). Critique of Judgement. Trans. by J. H. Bernard. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. ISBN: 978-1-306-33778-6
  3. Radford, A., & Narasimhan, K., et al. (2018). “Improving Language Understanding by Generative Pre-Training”. In: Preprint. Work in Progress
  4. Wu, T., & Kang, Y.-S. (1997). Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates-the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues in United States Law. Harv. Int’l. LJ, 38, 272.

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Metadata

Authors
Gubelmann, R.
Affiliations
University of St.Gallen (CH)
Corresponding author
Gubelmann, Reto
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2024-02-23
Volume
37
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W4392110156
Cited by
36
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 3
FWCI
51.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
University of St.Gallen
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
large language models, agency, speech acts, intentionality, autonomy, heteronomy, Kantian philosophy, pragmatism, transformer models, artificial agents, self-constitution, non-human actors

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-024-00696-1
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Gubelmann, R. (2024). Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00696-1

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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