Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.
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“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann, 2024
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“Thus, as Gubelmann (2024) points out, LLMs cannot be considered speakers.”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann (2024)
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“With this approach, unlike human use of language, there is no intention behind the strings of characters generated by LLMs.”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann (2024)
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Cites
Vaswani, A., Shazeer, N., Parmar, N., Uszkoreit, J., Jones, L., Gomez, A. N., Kaiser, L., & Polosukhin, I. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.03762 · Cited by 120,404 · cited 5×
“NLU:BERT OneparticularlyimpressiveNNLParchitecturebuildingonthetransformer architecture is called BERT, and it has been introduced by Devlin et al. (2019); when introducing the details of BERT’s architecture, the authors simply refer to Vaswani et al. (2017).”
InfluentialBERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding
Devlin, J., Chang, M.-W., Lee, K., & Toutanova, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/n19-1423 · Cited by 54,325 · cited 1×
“NLU:BERT OneparticularlyimpressiveNNLParchitecturebuildingonthetransformer architecture is called BERT, and it has been introduced by Devlin et al. (2019); when introducing the details of BERT’s architecture, the authors simply refer to Vaswani et al. (2017).”
Language Models are Few-Shot Learners
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“…suggesting completions of sentences, etc. BERT itself was quickly superseded by very similar, but better performing modifications such as RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019), XLNet (Yang et al., 2019), DeBERTa (He et al., 2020) as well as smaller versions such as DistilBERT (Sanh et al., 2019) and Albert…”
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“…of sentences, etc. BERT itself was quickly superseded by very similar, but better performing modifications such as RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019), XLNet (Yang et al., 2019), DeBERTa (He et al., 2020) as well as smaller versions such as DistilBERT (Sanh et al., 2019) and Albert (Lan et al., 2019).”
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Cited by
There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence
Porębski, A., & Figura, J. (2025) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-025-05868-8 · Cited by 20
“Thus, as Gubelmann (2024) points out, LLMs cannot be considered speakers.”
Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things
Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04961-4 · Cited by 19
“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
The bewitching AI: The Illusion of Communication with Large Language Models
Bottazzi Grifoni, E., & Ferrario, R. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00893-6 · Cited by 15
“For other approaches to intention and meaning in LLMs, see Floridi (2023) and Gubelmann (2024). of engagement with language.”
Algorithmic-authors in academia: blurring the boundaries of human and machine knowledge production
Gretzky, M., & Dishon, G. (2025) · Learning Media and Technology · doi:10.1080/17439884.2025.2452196 · Cited by 21
“Consequently, they contend that LLMs, operating on statistical patterns without true comprehension or intentionality, fail to meet the criteria for authorship (Gubelmann 2024; van Woudenberg, Ranalli, and Bracker 2024).”
Responsibility Gaps, LLMs & Organisations: Many Agents, Many Levels, and Many Interactions
Constantinescu, M., & Kaptein, M. (2025) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-025-00560-1 · Cited by 23
“As shown by Gubelmann (2024), despite impressive abilities to autonomously optimise their parameters during training, these LLMs cannot be properly regarded as moral agents and therefore bear no responsibility for their outcomes.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Gubelmann, R.
- Affiliations
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Gubelmann, Reto
- ORCID
- Gubelmann, Reto
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2024-02-23
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4392110156
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 51.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- University of St.Gallen
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- large language models, agency, speech acts, intentionality, autonomy, heteronomy, Kantian philosophy, pragmatism, transformer models, artificial agents, self-constitution, non-human actors
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