Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case
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Abstract
This article sets in with the question whether current or foreseeable transformer-based large language models (LLMs), such as the ones powering OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be language users in a way comparable to humans. It answers the question negatively, presenting the following argument. Apart from niche uses, to use language means to act. But LLMs are unable to act because they lack intentions. This, in turn, is because they are the wrong kind of being: agents with intentions need to be autonomous organisms while LLMs are heteronomous mechanisms. To conclude, the article argues, based on structural aspects of transformer-based LLMs, that these LLMs have taken a first step away from mechanistic artificiality to autonomous self-constitution, which means that these models are (slowly) moving into a direction that someday might result in non-human, but equally non-artificial agents, thus subverting the time-honored Kantian distinction between organism and mechanism.
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“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann, 2024
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“Thus, as Gubelmann (2024) points out, LLMs cannot be considered speakers.”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann (2024)
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“With this approach, unlike human use of language, there is no intention behind the strings of characters generated by LLMs.”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Gubelmann (2024)
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Metadata
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- Gubelmann, R.
- Affiliations
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Gubelmann, Reto
- ORCID
- Gubelmann, Reto
- Venue
- Philosophy & Technology
- Published
- 2024-02-23
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
- 2210-5441
- OpenAlex
- W4392110156
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 51.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- University of St.Gallen
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- large language models, agency, speech acts, intentionality, autonomy, heteronomy, Kantian philosophy, pragmatism, transformer models, artificial agents, self-constitution, non-human actors
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.