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ChatGPT and the Technology-Education Tension: Applying Contextual Virtue Epistemology to a Cognitive Artifact

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Cassinadri, Guido · 2024 · Philosophy & Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 113 of the 113 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 73 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (Fasoli, 2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that Pritchard's proposed solution to the "technology-education tension" (TET)—combining virtue epistemology with the theory of extended cognition (EXT)—is only partial, and proposes instead a "contextual virtue epistemology" that combines Pritchard's virtue framework with Fasoli's taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. It applies this framework to ChatGPT, characterized as an intrinsically multifunctional computational cognitive artifact that can substitute, complement, or constitute students' cognitive processes.

Key findings

  • Pritchard's EXT-based solution to the TET is affected by at least four problems: (1) the conditions for EXT are unclear; (2) even if clarified, they may not be recognizable in practice; (3) they may not apply to every form of tool-use or every TET case; and (4) tool-uses may have different effects on different components of the cognitive character, so "EXT does not per se solve the TET." A fifth problem (affective, motivational, existential effects) is noted in a footnote.
  • The proposed framework distinguishes three relationships between cognitive artifacts and cognitive processes—constitutive, complementary, and substitutive—defined via the "degree of cognitive agency" the agent exerts, and extends these to extended systems (Constitutive-EXT, Complementary-EXT, Substitutive-EXT).
  • The paper introduces "cognitive trade-offs": the equilibria and dynamics of enhancement and diminishment of different components of the cognitive character, considering both biological and technological resources in embedded and extended systems (e.g., extending ability X at the cost of diminishing ability Y or virtue Z).
  • ChatGPT is characterized as a cognitive artifact whose major threat is substituting human cognitive abilities across many tasks; the paper sketches epistemically virtuous educational uses (e.g., comparing/ranking ChatGPT outputs, the "zero trust framework," process-oriented writing assessment) drawing on Arango-Muñoz's criteria of coherence, consensus, intelligibility, and relevance.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis: the paper is a theoretical treatment, not an empirical study. It commits to Pritchard's (2013, 2014, 2016) account of cognitive character and virtue responsibilism, then critiques Pritchard's EXT-based solution and develops an alternative.
  • The proposed framework combines Pritchard's virtue epistemology with Fasoli's (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, applied to ChatGPT (implementing GPT-3.5) as the most notable LLM example, with arguments stated to generalize to other generative AI systems.
  • Illustrative examples are drawn from the existing literature (e.g., Mollick & Mollick 2022; Dan et al. 2023; Heersmink & Knight 2018) rather than from new data; the paper calls for empirical analyses to test whether such exercises develop capacities contributing to human flourishing.

Limitations

  • Stated: the framework presented "is limited to representational cognitive artifacts," leaving out non-representational artifacts (Malafouris 2013); the author cannot offer a comprehensive normative evaluation of the different components of the cognitive character, since it is context-dependent and must be addressed in a multidisciplinary way; the analysis of distributed cognition and socially distributed epistemology in education is said to go beyond the scope of the work; and further research is needed on educational group dynamics involving AI tools.
  • Evident from the text: there is no empirical data or sample—the educational applications are proposals and illustrations, and the author explicitly notes that "we need empirical analyses" to show such exercises are useful; the paper also leaves open for EXT theorists the question of whether substitutive extended cognitive systems are genuine instances of EXT.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s13347-024-00701-7

Cites

113 of 113 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

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Claims the paper makes

6 Valid · 2 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 41 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Boston: MA, Blackwell.
  2. Clowes, R.W. (2020). The internet extended person: exoself or doppelganger? Límite. Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología, 15(22), 1-23. https://research.unl.pt/ws/portalfiles/portal/29762990/document_8_.pdf
  3. Fasoli, M. (2016). Neuroethics of cognitive artifacts. In A. Lavazza (Ed.), Frontiers in neuroethics: Conceptual and empirical advancements (pp. 63–75). Cambridge scholars publishing.
  4. Mill, J. S. (1985). On Liberty. Penguin Classics.
  5. Siegel, H. (1997). Rationality Redeemed? Routledge.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Cassinadri, G.
Affiliations
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (IT)
Corresponding author
Cassinadri, Guido
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2024-01-27
Volume
37
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W4391278536
Cited by
54
References
108
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 8
FWCI
21.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Education › Digital Education and Society
  • Social Sciences › Education › Artificial Intelligence in Education
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Digital Media and Philosophy
Keywords
ChatGPT, virtue epistemology, extended cognition, cognitive artifacts, large language models, generative AI in education, intellectual virtues, Pritchard

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