Mental models and probabilistic thinking
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 3×
“This account is compatible with the idea of estimating likelihoods in terms of scenarios, which was proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1973, p. 229) , and it forms a bridge between the model theory and the heuristic approach to judgements of probability.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialToulmin, S. E. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840005 · Cited by 7,101
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506 · cited 1×
“Individuals are indeed often overconfident in their inductive judgements, and Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting (1991) have propounded a theory of “probabilistic mental models” to account for this phenomenon.”
BackgroundEvidential impact of base rates
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.011 · Cited by 591 · cited 1×
“... effects include difficulty in isolating genuinely diagnostic data (see, for example, Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979), testing hypotheses in terms of their positive instances (Evans, 1989; Klayman & Ha, 1987), neglect of base rates in certain circumstances (Tversky & Kahnema…”
Background
Cited by
Debunking: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychological Efficacy of Messages Countering Misinformation
Chan, M.-P. S., Jones, C. R., Hall Jamieson, K., & Albarracín, D. (2017) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797617714579 · Cited by 898
“Research on mental models ( Johnson-Laird, 1994; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) suggests that an effective debunking message should be sufficiently detailed to allow recipients to abandon initial information for a new model ( Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988).”
BackgroundWorking-memory capacity explains reasoning ability—and a little bit more
Süß, H.-M., Oberauer, K., Wittmann, W. W., Wilhelm, O., & Schulze, R. (2002) · Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0160-2896(01)00100-3 · Cited by 601
Mental models concepts for system dynamics research
Doyle, J. K., & Ford, D. N. (1998) · System Dynamics Review · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-1727(199821)14:1<3::aid-sdr140>3.0.co;2-k · Cited by 440
The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0696 · Cited by 324
“This explains why experimental studies of syllogistic reasoning with Most and Few have not previously been conducted, despite the fact that in, for example, mental models theory, there has been considerable theoretical interest in these quantifiers (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1994).”
BackgroundJenkins, A. C., & Mitchell, J. P. (2010) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp109 · Cited by 183
“…matched for ambiguity, suggesting that what primarily drives the engagement of this region is not the type of mental state being inferred but rather the computational demands associated with constructing novel predictions from minimal information (Johnson-Laird 1994, 2001; Mitchell forthcoming).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson-Laird, P. N.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1994-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1-3
- Pages
- 189-209
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1974031516
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 5.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mental models and probabilistic thinking. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90028-0
- The paper
- Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1994). Mental models and probabilistic thinking. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90028-0
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.