Mentalizing under Uncertainty: Dissociated Neural Responses to Ambiguous and Unambiguous Mental State Inferences
Open accessAbstract
The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only others' beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of "uncertainty," in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a target's mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social-cognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This fMRI study dissociates neural responses to mental-state type (beliefs vs. preferences) from mentalizing under ambiguity. It finds that medial prefrontal cortex responds more to ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of content, whereas right temporoparietal junction responds more to beliefs than preferences regardless of ambiguity.
Key findings
- Dorsal MPFC showed greater response during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences, \(F_{1,14}=7.44, P<0.02, d=0.73\), but did not differentiate beliefs from preferences, \(F_{1,14}=1.72, P>0.21, d=0.35\).
- Right TPJ showed greater activation for belief than preference scenarios, \(F_{1,14}=9.74, P<0.01, d=0.83\), but did not differ by ambiguity, \(F_{1,14}=0.79, P>0.38, d=0.24\).
- Ventral MPFC showed main effects of both ambiguity, \(F_{1,14}=7.10, P<0.02, d=0.71\), and content, \(F_{1,14}=12.26, P<0.0005, d=0.94\), responding more to ambiguous than unambiguous inferences and more to preferences than beliefs.
- Behaviorally, participants converged on the modal answer 87% of the time for unambiguous scenarios versus 51% for ambiguous scenarios, \(\chi^2(1, n=15)=8.14, P<0.005\); they chose “none of the above” less than 1% for unambiguous questions versus 30% for ambiguous questions, \(\chi^2(1, n=15)=27.13, P<0.0001\).
Methods
- Fifteen right-handed college undergraduates (9 females, age range 18–22 years, mean age 19.8 years) underwent fMRI while reading short vignettes about a protagonist’s beliefs or preferences, in either unambiguous or ambiguous versions, plus nonsocial control scenarios.
- Each trial presented the story and question for 10 s, then four response choices for 4 s, followed by 12 s fixation; participants completed 60 mentalizing scenarios and 12 nonsocial scenarios across 4 functional runs.
- fMRI data were analyzed in SPM2 using a general linear model, with region-of-interest interrogation of mentalizing > nonsocial regions and whole-brain random-effects contrasts for ambiguity and content type.
Limitations
- The paper states that the current results cannot adjudicate whether MPFC contributions to uncertain inference making are limited to social situations or may extend to nonsocial contexts; this awaits future empirical test.
- The paper states that its explanation for vMPFC’s less selective profile is speculative, and that because the study relied primarily on transient beliefs and stable preferences, additional research is needed to determine vMPFC’s specific contributions.
- Evident from the text: the sample was small (\(n=15\)), and the design tested only beliefs and preferences, not the broader range of mental states such as feelings, desires, or intentions discussed in the introduction.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 30 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
The 2-way interaction of region × ambiguity did not reach significance (F2,42 = 1.79, P > 0.17).
“however, the 2-way interaction of region × ambiguity did not reach significance, F2,42 = 1.79, P > 0.17.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
A whole-brain random-effects analysis of all 'mentalizing > nonsocial' scenarios revealed a set of regions commonly associated with social cognition, including dorsal and ventral MPFC, right and left TPJ, superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, and medial parietal cortex.
“To identify brain regions involved in mentalizing, we first conducted a whole-brain, random-effects analysis of all “mentalizing > nonsocial” scenarios. This contrast revealed a set of regions commonly associated with social cognition, including both dorsal and ventral MPFC (vMPFC), right and left TPJ, the superior temporal sulcus, the temporal poles, and medial parietal cortex (Fig. 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
dMPFC showed greater response during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences (F1,14 = 7.44, P < 0.02, d = 0.73).
“First, dorsal MPFC (dMPFC) demonstrated greater response during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences, F1,14 = 7.44, P < 0.02, d = 0.73”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a significant 2-way interaction of region × content (F2,42 = 9.10, P < 0.001), confirming that the pattern of response to beliefs and preferences differed across dMPFC, vMPFC, and right TPJ.
“Moreover, the presence of a significant 2-way interaction of region × content, F2,42 = 9.10, P < 0.001, confirmed that the pattern of response to beliefs and preferences differed across these 3 regions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
vMPFC emerged from the whole-brain contrast of 'preference > belief'.
“Whereas right TPJ emerged from the contrast of “belief > preference,” vMPFC emerged from the contrast of “preference > belief” (Table 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
The study observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity.
“we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The ambiguous and unambiguous vignettes differ only in the certainty of the mental state inference and not in other task-relevant ways.
- Findingown data
vMPFC showed greater response during inferences about preferences than during inferences about beliefs (main effect of content, F1,14 = 12.26, P < 0.0005, d = 0.94).
“Finally, activation in vMPFC was characterized by main effects of both ambiguity, F1,14 = 7.10, P < 0.02, d = 0.71, and content, F1,14 = 12.26, P < 0.0005, d = 0.94, such that the region responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences and also responded more during inferences about preferences than during inferences about beliefs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
dMPFC did not differentiate between preferences and beliefs (F1,14 = 1.72, P > 0.21, d = 0.35).
“but did not differentiate between preferences and beliefs, F1,14 = 1.72, P > 0.21, d = 0.35.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants overwhelmingly converged on a single answer to each unambiguous scenario, choosing the modal response 87% of the time.
“Participants overwhelmingly converged on a single answer to each unambiguous scenario, choosing the modal response 87% of the time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The multiple-choice responses to the vignettes reflect participants' mental state inferences.
- Findingown data
All 3 regions (dMPFC, vMPFC, right TPJ) showed no evidence of an ambiguity × content interaction (all F values < 1.65, P values > 0.22).
“All 3 regions showed no evidence of an ambiguity × content interaction, all F values < 1.65, P values > 0.22.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
A whole-brain random-effects contrast of 'ambiguous > unambiguous' scenarios yielded dMPFC as the sole region.
“To confirm these findings, we also conducted a whole-brain, random-effects contrast of “ambiguous > unambiguous” scenarios. Consistent with the region-of-interest analysis, the sole region to emerge from this contrast was dMPFC.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
Right TPJ activity was greater for mentalizing about beliefs than for nonsocial processing.
“Replicating earlier research (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and Powell 2006), mentalizing about others’ beliefs was associated with greater activity in right TPJ compared with mentalizing about others’ preferences or to nonsocial processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Saxe and Kanwisher 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Saxe and Powell 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
vMPFC showed greater response during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences (main effect of ambiguity, F1,14 = 7.10, P < 0.02, d = 0.71).
“Finally, activation in vMPFC was characterized by main effects of both ambiguity, F1,14 = 7.10, P < 0.02, d = 0.71, and content, F1,14 = 12.26, P < 0.0005, d = 0.94, such that the region responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences and also responded more during inferences about preferences than during inferences about beliefs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Right TPJ showed greater activation during belief than preference scenarios (F1,14 = 9.74, P < 0.01, d = 0.83).
“In contrast, right TPJ was characterized by greater activation during belief than preference scenarios, F1,14 = 9.74, P < 0.01, d = 0.83”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state.
“Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The ambiguous and unambiguous vignettes differ only in the certainty of the mental state inference and not in other task-relevant ways.
- Findingown data
Right TPJ did not differentiate between scenarios as a function of ambiguity (F1,14 = 0.79, P > 0.38, d = 0.24).
“but did not differentiate between scenarios as a function of ambiguity, F1,14 = 0.79, P > 0.38, d = 0.24”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Right TPJ emerged from the whole-brain contrast of 'belief > preference'.
“Whereas right TPJ emerged from the contrast of “belief > preference,” vMPFC emerged from the contrast of “preference > belief” (Table 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
No differences were observed between true and false beliefs.
“no differences were observed between true and false beliefs, and analyses were therefore collapsed across this dimension.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty.
“the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The ambiguous and unambiguous vignettes differ only in the certainty of the mental state inference and not in other task-relevant ways.
- Findingown data
vMPFC responded more during unambiguous inferences about preferences than during unambiguous inferences about beliefs (P < 0.02).
“One possibility is that activity in vMPFC, which responded more during unambiguous inferences about preferences than during unambiguous inferences about beliefs (P < 0.02), could be associated specifically with person-focused attribution (Mitchell et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
No other regions sensitive to ambiguity (e.g., dMPFC) distinguished between preferences and beliefs.
“and no other regions sensitive to ambiguity (e.g., dMPFC) distinguished between preferences and beliefs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context.
“These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A substantial amount of other research supports the possibility that MPFC may subserve mentalizing under uncertainty rather than inferences about particular types of mental states per se.
“a substantial amount of other research supports the possibility that MPFC may subserve mentalizing under uncertainty rather than inferences about particular types of mental states per se.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis et al. 2007; Buckner and Carroll 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Mentalizing under uncertainty likely relies on an alternative, more flexible, and internally generated system for making sense of other minds.
“mentalizing under uncertainty likely relies on an alternative, more flexible, and internally generated system for making sense of other minds.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The current findings add to the emerging empirical consensus that cognitive challenges of mentalizing are met by an equally varied set of distinct cognitive processes rather than a single, monolithic 'theory-of-mind' module.
“The current findings add to the emerging empirical consensus that these challenges are met by an equally varied set of distinct cognitive processes rather than a single, monolithic “theory-of-mind” module.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
In some situations, an inference about the state of another person's mind is all but dictated by given information.
“In some situations, an inference about the state of another person's mind is all but dictated by given information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
The information provided in typical belief mentalizing tasks essentially dictates the mental state of the protagonist, making perceivers' inferences unambiguous.
“although the TPJ has been specifically linked to a particular type of mental state—beliefs—the information provided in typical belief mentalizing tasks essentially dictates the mental state of the protagonist, making perceivers’ inferences unambiguous.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Samson et al. 2004; Saxe and Wexler 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The information provided in typical preference or affective mentalizing tasks leaves inferences much more open-ended.
“the information provided in typical preference or affective mentalizing tasks leaves inferences much more open-ended”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hynes et al. 2006; Mitchell et al. 2006; Vollm et al. 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Such a process may be less useful under circumstances in which another person's mental state could be inferred simply by applying general "rules" about human minds.
“In contrast, such a process may be less useful under circumstances in which another person's mental state could be inferred simply by applying general “rules” about human minds.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When inferences are relatively underspecified by situational constraints, perceivers may find it especially useful to mentalize on the basis of simulated, internally generated information.
“When inferences are relatively underspecified by situational constraints, perceivers may find it especially useful to mentalize on the basis of such simulated, internally generated information”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Most extant research has confounded differences in mentalizing about varying types of internal states with differences in mentalizing under varying degrees of certainty.
“most extant research has confounded differences in mentalizing about varying types of internal states with differences in mentalizing under varying degrees of certainty.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Monte Carlo simulations confirmed that the statistical criteria provided a brainwise alpha level of P < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons.
“Monte Carlo simulations (S. Slotnick, Boston College) of our brain volume confirmed that these criteria provided a brainwise alpha level of P < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Right TPJ appears to contribute to social cognition by subserving inferences about specific types of mental states (i.e., beliefs).
“Although some regions, such as the right TPJ, appear to contribute to social cognition by subserving inferences about specific types of mental states (i.e., beliefs)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When ambiguity about another person's mental states is high, inferences about other minds may be guided by the contents of one's own internal mental experience, mediated by MPFC.
“That is, when ambiguity about another person's mental states is high, our inferences about other minds may be guided by the contents of our own internal mental experience, mediated by MPFC (Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae 2005b; Mitchell et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae 2005b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mitchell et al. 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Jenkins et al. 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The current results suggest that the human brain responds to mentalizing challenges by selectively engaging different regions as a function of the particular social-cognitive challenge to be met.
“The current results suggest that the human brain appears to respond to such demands by selectively engaging different regions as a function of the particular social–cognitive challenge to be met.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Self-based simulationist processes may be needed to infer mental states under conditions of greater uncertainty, when contextual cues less firmly constrain the possible goings on of another person's mind.
“However, more self-based simulationist processes may be needed to infer mental states under conditions of greater uncertainty, that is, when contextual cues less firmly constrain the possible goings on of another person's mind.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
dMPFC is indifferent to the distinctions between others' beliefs and preferences.
“other regions, such as the dMPFC, are indifferent to the distinctions between others’ beliefs and preferences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
MPFC may contribute preferentially to social cognition when making sense of new situations, unfamiliar individuals, or ambiguously motivated behavior-in other words, when mentalizing under uncertainty.
“Instead, the MPFC may contribute preferentially to social cognition when making sense of new situations, unfamiliar individuals, or ambiguously motivated behavior—in other words, when mentalizing under uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Rule-based mentalizing may be a useful strategy when perceivers reason about unambiguous mental states in ways that are strongly guided by explicit contextual information.
“On one hand, rule-based mentalizing may be a useful strategy when perceivers reason about unambiguous mental states in ways that are strongly guided by explicit contextual information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Analysis of participants' agreement on a single response for each vignette confirmed that preference scenarios were no more ambiguous than belief scenarios.
“Analysis of participants’ agreement on a single response for each vignette confirmed that preference scenarios were no more ambiguous than belief scenarios”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 8
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 21
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe pattern of responding (higher agreement and less use of none-of-the-above for unambiguous vs ambiguous) was observed for both beliefs and preferences.
“This pattern of responding was observed for both beliefs (88% agreement for unambiguous belief vs. 53% agreement for ambiguous belief inferences) and preferences (84% agreement for unambiguous preference vs. 51% agreement for ambiguous preference inferences).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The multiple-choice responses to the vignettes reflect participants' mental state inferences.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataResponses were more variable for ambiguous scenarios, with participants agreeing on a single answer only 51% of the time.
“In contrast, responses were more variable for ambiguous scenarios, with participants agreeing on a single answer only 51% of the time, χ2 (1, n = 15) = 8.14, P < 0.005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The multiple-choice responses to the vignettes reflect participants' mental state inferences.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor unambiguous questions, participants chose "none of the above" less than 1% of the time, whereas for ambiguous questions, participants made use of this option 30% of the time.
“Moreover, for unambiguous questions, participants chose “none of the above” less than 1% of the time, whereas for ambiguous questions, participants made use of this option 30% of the time, χ2 (1, n = 15) = 27.13, P < 0.0001.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The multiple-choice responses to the vignettes reflect participants' mental state inferences.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataMedial parietal cortex showed a marginally significant interaction between type and ambiguity (F1,14 = 3.03, P < 0.10, d = 0.47), such that it responded more during unambiguous than ambiguous inferences about beliefs but more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences about preferences.
“In contrast, a marginally significant interaction between type and ambiguity was observed in medial parietal cortex, F1,14 = 3.03, P < 0.10, d = 0.47, such that the region responded more during unambiguous than ambiguous inferences about beliefs but more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences about preferences”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn medial parietal cortex, neither the main effect of ambiguity (P > 0.45) nor the main effect of content (P > 0.76) approached significance.
“however, neither the main effect of ambiguity (P > 0.45) nor the main effect of content (P > 0.76) approached significance in this region.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationResearchers have identified a set of several brain regions that respond consistently when considering the minds of others: dorsal and ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial parietal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus.
“researchers have identified a set of several brain regions that respond consistently when considering the minds of others: dorsal and ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial parietal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fletcher et al. 1995; Goel et al. 1995; Gallagher et al. 2000, 2002
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenPresentation was randomized across participants such that no participant ever encountered both an ambiguous and an unambiguous version of the same story.
“with presentation randomized across participants such that no participant ever encountered both an ambiguous and an unambiguous version of the same story.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMPFC has been implicated in processes supporting the ability to draw on elements of relevant past experiences in order to formulate novel predictions.
“Recently, this region has been implicated in processes supporting the ability to draw on elements of relevant past experiences in order to formulate novel predictions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Addis et al. 2007; Buckner and Carroll 2007
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIf someone freely and consistently chooses an object over comparable alternatives, then that person likely prefers that object.
“if someone freely and consistently chooses an object (e.g., oatmeal cookies) over comparable alternatives, then that person likely prefers that object”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kelley 1972
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationComparisons across past studies observed greater MPFC activation during relatively ambiguous inferences about preferences than during relatively unambiguous inferences about beliefs, concluding that the relevant difference was in the type of mental state being considered.
“Comparisons across past studies have observed greater MPFC activation during relatively ambiguous inferences about preferences than during relatively unambiguous inference about beliefs, concluding that the relevant difference was in the type of mental state being considered (Van Overwalle 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Van Overwalle 2009 source
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PremisecitationMPFC has been implicated in the use of one's own experience to mentalize about others.
“as well as in the use of one's own experience to mentalize about others”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008
Not checked in the free run.
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Study design and conductnone givenStimuli in all 4 groups (ambiguous preference, ambiguous belief, unambiguous preference, and unambiguous belief) were matched for length (mean number of characters = 213.5).
“Stimuli in all 4 groups (ambiguous preference, ambiguous belief, unambiguous preference, and unambiguous belief) were matched for length (mean number of characters = 213.5).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationA right-lateralized region of TPJ has been implicated specifically in representing others' beliefs.
“a right-lateralized region of TPJ has been implicated specifically in representing others’ beliefs”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and Powell 2006
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationMatched control stories in which participants inferred the content of physical representations (such as those in photographs or on maps) were used for comparison.
“Matched control stories in which participants inferred the content of physical representations (such as those in photographs or on maps) were used for comparison”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zaitchik 1990
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMPFC has emerged consistently from tasks involving inferences about affective states or preferences.
“MPFC has emerged consistently from tasks involving inferences about affective states or preferences”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae 2005a; Hynes et al. 2006; Mitchell et al. 2006
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationMPFC contributes to a network of regions that subserves the construction of simulated scenarios.
“Recently, a number of commentators have suggested that MPFC contributes to a network of regions that subserves the construction of simulated scenarios.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Addis et al. 2007
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- cites Buckner and Carroll 2007 source
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- cites Schacter et al. 2007
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMPFC is consistently engaged by attempts to prospectively imagine the future and to retrospectively remember the past.
“For example, in addition to its ubiquitous role in mentalizing, MPFC is consistently engaged by attempts to prospectively imagine the future and to retrospectively remember the past (Addis et al. 2007; Buckner and Carroll 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Spreng et al. 2009), both of which require perceivers to use internally generated simulations of a situation that is divorced from the current context”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Addis et al. 2007
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- cites Buckner and Carroll 2007 source
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- cites Schacter et al. 2007
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PremisecitationRecent findings demonstrate that regions of the right TPJ previously thought to be selective for social cognition also contribute to decidedly nonsocial tasks.
“Indeed, recent findings demonstrate that regions of the right TPJ previously thought to be selective for social cognition also contribute to decidedly nonsocial tasks (Mitchell 2008; Scholz et al. 2009), raising the possibility that MPFC will also prove to participate across both social and nonsocial situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mitchell 2008
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- cites Scholz et al. 2009
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningMentalizing under uncertainty may require perceivers to engage in processes of simulation, such as imagining their own response to an analogous situation or drawing on comparable events from their own life.
“Likewise, mentalizing under uncertainty may require perceivers to engage in similar processes of simulation, for example, by imagining their own response to an analogous situation or by drawing on aspects of comparable events from their own life.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPsychologists and philosophers have posited 2 main accounts of how humans understand other minds: simulationist and rule-based.
“Psychologists and philosophers have together posited 2 main accounts of the processes by which human beings understand other minds: broadly, those that are “simulationist” (Heal 1986; Gordon 1992) and those that are more “rule based” (also known as “theory” theories; Gopnik and Wellman 1994).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Heal 1986
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- cites Gordon 1992
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- cites Gopnik and Wellman 1994
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationvMPFC may be sensitive not only to type of mental state being inferred but also the ambiguity of the information on which such an inference can be made.
“but suggests that this region may be sensitive not only to type of mental state being inferred but also the ambiguity of the information on which such an inference can be made (cf., Van Overwalle 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Van Overwalle 2009 source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationown dataThe current results cannot adjudicate whether MPFC contributions to uncertain inference making are limited to social situations or may extend to relatively less social contexts.
“In and of themselves, the current results cannot adjudicate whether MPFC contributions to uncertain inference making are limited to social situations (i.e., mentalizing) or may extend to relatively less social contexts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationown dataActivity in vMPFC could be associated specifically with person-focused attribution.
“One possibility is that activity in vMPFC, which responded more during unambiguous inferences about preferences than during unambiguous inferences about beliefs (P < 0.02), could be associated specifically with person-focused attribution (Mitchell et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell et al. 2005 source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationBecause the mind of another person is inherently mutable and impossible to perceive directly, inferences about human minds may be fundamentally more ambiguous than inferences about inanimate, physical surroundings.
“Because the mind of another person is inherently mutable and impossible to perceive directly, inferences about human minds may be fundamentally more ambiguous than inferences about our inanimate, physical surroundings (Mitchell forthcoming).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mitchell forthcoming
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningMPFC-mediated processes might also be engaged during nonsocial inferences that require consideration of multiple, 'fuzzy' alternatives based on internally generated simulations.
“However, such MPFC-mediated processes might also be engaged during nonsocial inferences that likewise require the consideration of multiple, “fuzzy” alternatives based on internally generated simulations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningOne reason MPFC has been consistently associated with social cognition may be that inferences about the minds of other people are necessarily less constrained than inferences about the physical world.
“Intriguingly, this observation suggests that one reason that MPFC has been so consistently associated with social cognition may be that inferences about the minds of other people are necessarily less constrained than inferences about the physical world.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningTo the extent that MPFC contributes to simulating plausible outcomes for indistinct and shifting phenomena, MPFC should be expected to participate frequently in understanding the minds of others.
“To the extent that MPFC contributes to simulating plausible outcomes for indistinct and shifting phenomena, this region should be expected to participate frequently in understanding the minds of others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The multiple-choice responses to the vignettes reflect participants' mental state inferences.
“To confirm our conditionalization of scenarios as unambiguous and ambiguous, we first examined the distribution of participants’ responses to each question as a function of ambiguity.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The ambiguous and unambiguous vignettes differ only in the certainty of the mental state inference and not in other task-relevant ways.
“Unambiguous versions of each vignette were written such that the information in the scenario would strongly suggest the mental state of the protagonist, whereas ambiguous vignettes implied that the protagonist's mental state could be any one of multiple possibilities.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The dmPFC has consistently been related to the reflection of one's own and simulation of others' mind states.
“Moreover, the dmPFC has consistently been related to the (possibly interwoven) reflection of own and simulation of others’ mind states (Lamm et al. 2007; Jenkins and Mitchell 2010; Mitchell et al. 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2007).”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Jenkins and Mitchell 2010
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- Authors
- Jenkins, A. C., & Mitchell, J. P.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Jenkins, A. C.
- Venue
- Cerebral Cortex
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-05-28
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 404-410
- ISSN
- 1047-3211 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2199
- PMC
- PMC2803737
- OpenAlex
- W2162281586
- Semantic Scholar
- 09fb313f59eee1ee0a735108cd684764c2bc005b
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 18.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cerebral Cortex (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Center for Research Resources (P41-RR-14075, P41RR014075)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- mentalization, ambiguity, mental state inference, belief, preferences, medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, social cognition, uncertainty, double dissociation, neural basis of social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Association, Brain, Brain Mapping, Cognition, Culture, Dominance, Cerebral, Empathy, Female, Humans, Language, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Neuropsychological Tests, Parietal Lobe, Social Behavior, Speech Perception, Temporal Lobe, Verbal Behavior, Prefrontal Cortex, Young Adult, Theory of Mind
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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