Applying global workspace theory to the frame problem
Abstract
The subject of this article is the frame problem, as conceived by certain cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, notably Fodor for whom it stands as a fundamental obstacle to progress in cognitive science. The challenge is to explain the capacity of so-called informationally unencapsulated cognitive processes to deal effectively with information from potentially any cognitive domain without the burden of having to explicitly sift the relevant from the irrelevant. The paper advocates a global workspace architecture, with its ability to manage massively parallel resources in the context of a serial thread of computation, as an answer to this challenge. Analogical reasoning is given particular attention, since it exemplifies informational unencapsulation in its most extreme form. Because global workspace theory also purports to account for the distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing, the paper advances the tentative conclusion that consciousness may go hand-in-hand with a solution to the frame problem in the biological brain.
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Normal conscious experiences need both traditional feature binding and frame binding.
“In sum, normal conscious experiences need both traditional feature binding and frame binding (Shanahan and Baars, 2005)4.”
From Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents (2013) · cites this paper as Shanahan and Baars, 2005
Cites
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
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Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 2× · see citing works
“A considerable body of empirical evidence in favour of this thesis has accumulated in recent years (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).”
BackgroundHow conscious experience and working memory interact
Baars, B. J., & Franklin, S. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00056-1 · Cited by 541 · see citing works
Self-citationSingle-neuron correlates of subjective vision in the human medial temporal lobe
Kreiman, G., Fried, I., & Koch, C. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.072194099 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
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Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146 · see citing works
Chapter 2 Design for a Working Memory
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Toward a computational theory of conscious processing
Dehaene, S., Charles, L., King, J.-R., & Marti, S. (2014) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2013.12.005 · Cited by 404 · see citing works
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Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents
Baars, B. J., Franklin, S., & Ramsoy, T. Z. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00200 · Cited by 294 · see citing works
“Such local ambiguities exist at every level of language comprehension and production (Baars, 1988; Shanahan and Baars, 2005).”
BackgroundSelf-citationInductive biases for deep learning of higher-level cognition
Goyal, A., & Bengio, Y. (2022) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2021.0068 · Cited by 300 · see citing works
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- Authors
- Shanahan, M., & Baars, B.
- Affiliations
- Imperial College London (GB)
- Neurosciences Institute (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shanahan, Murray
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 157-176
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993254132
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 12.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
- Keywords
- global workspace theory, frame problem, analogical reasoning, consciousness, unconscious information processing, massively parallel computing, Fodor, cognitive architecture
- MeSH terms
- Consciousness, Humans, Mental Processes, Psychological Theory, Thinking, Cognitive Science
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