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Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking

De Neys, Wim, Glumicic, Tamara·2008·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002
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Abstract

Popular dual process theories have characterized human thinking as an interplay between an intuitive-heuristic and demanding-analytic reasoning process. Although monitoring the output of the two systems for conflict is crucial to avoid decision making errors there are some widely different views on the efficiency of the process. Kahneman [Kahneman, D. (2002). Maps of bounded rationality: A perspective on intuitive judgement and choice. Nobel Prize Lecture. Retrieved January 11, 2006, from: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf] and Evans [Evans, J. St. B. T. (1984). Heuristic and analytic processing in reasoning. British Journal of Psychology, 75, 451-468], for example, claim that the monitoring of the heuristic system is typically quite lax whereas others such as Sloman [Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22] and Epstein [Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologists, 49, 709-724] claim it is flawless and people typically experience a struggle between what they "know" and "feel" in case of a conflict. The present study contrasted these views. Participants solved classic base rate neglect problems while thinking aloud. In these problems a stereotypical description cues a response that conflicts with the response based on the analytic base rate information. Verbal protocols showed no direct evidence for an expli…

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Metadata

Authors
De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-03
Volume
106
Issue
3
Pages
1248-1299
ISSN
0010-0277
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002
Cited by
346
References
5
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002