Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Open accessAbstract
Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2-4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.
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Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news, religious and paranormal beliefs, conspiracy theories, and pseudo-profound bullshit.
“Recent research has linked individual differences in analytic thinking with skepticism about various epistemically suspect information, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019;2020), religious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2016;Shenhav et al., 2012), conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), and pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al., 2015;Pennycook & Rand, 2020).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
This result extends prior research that associated analytic thinking with higher scrutiny towards other post-truth phenomena, such as fake news and conspiracy theories.
“This result extends prior research that associated analytic thinking with higher scrutiny towards other post-truth phenomena, such as fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019, 2020) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
From The detection of political deepfakes (2022) · cites this paper as Swami et al., 2014
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“…account has shown that analytic thinking is correlated with skepticism about a wide range of epistemically suspect claims (reviewed in Pennycook, et al., 2015a; Pennycook, 2018), such as those pertaining to supernatural beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
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BackgroundSusceptibility to misinformation about COVID-19 around the world
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ResultThe Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
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Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12476 · Cited by 879 · see citing works
Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance with government guidelines in England
Freeman, D., Waite, F., Rosebrock, L., Petit, A., Causier, C., East, A., Jenner, L., Teale, A.-L., Carr, L., Mulhall, S., et al. (2022) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291720001890 · Cited by 714 · see citing works
“…control (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013), perceptions of lower social status (Freeman & Bentall, 2017), less analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014), lower levels of education and income (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Freeman &…”
Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines.
Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000729 · Cited by 593 · see citing works
Misinformation: susceptibility, spread, and interventions to immunize the public
van der Linden, S. (2022) · Nature Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41591-022-01713-6 · Cited by 570 · see citing works
On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
Pennycook, G., Allan Cheyne, J., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500006999 · Cited by 536 · see citing works
“, 2012; Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012), and are less likely to engage in conspiratorial ideation (Swami et al., 2014) or believe in the efficacy of alternative medicine (Browne et al.”
Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories
van Prooijen, J. (2016) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3301 · Cited by 516 · see citing works
Reliance on emotion promotes belief in fake news
Martel, C., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications · doi:10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3 · Cited by 470 · see citing works
Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., Callan, M. J., Dawtry, R. J., & Harvey, A. J. (2016) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2015.1051586 · Cited by 414 · see citing works
“As several studies have shown, just like conspiracy belief (Swami et al., 2014), belief in the paranormal is negatively associated with analytical thinking style (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).”
BackgroundPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/uhbk9 · Cited by 390 · see citing works
Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain
van Prooijen, J., & Douglas, K. M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2530 · Cited by 483 · see citing works
Social Media, Echo Chambers, and Political Polarization
Barberá, P. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.004 · Cited by 373 · see citing works
van Prooijen, J., Douglas, K. M., & De Inocencio, C. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2331 · Cited by 355 · see citing works
Everyday Consequences of Analytic Thinking
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721415604610 · Cited by 360 · see citing works
Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review
van Mulukom, V., Pummerer, L., Alper, S., Bai, H., Čavojová, V., Farias, J., Kay, C. S., Lazarević, L., Lobato, E. J. C., Marinthe, G., et al. (2022) · Social Science & Medicine (1967) · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 · Cited by 287 · see citing works
“Several cognitive biases and styles, usually those that conflict with more analytical, elaborative thinking, are argued to foster conspiracy beliefs (Brotherton and French, 2014; Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2014).”
Bronstein, M. V., Pennycook, G., Bear, A., Rand, D. G., & Cannon, T. D. (2019) · Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.09.005 · Cited by 324 · see citing works
Conspiracy Theories: Evolved Functions and Psychological Mechanisms
van Prooijen, J.-W., & van Vugt, M. (2018) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691618774270 · Cited by 414 · see citing works
Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2022) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-032420-031329 · Cited by 317 · see citing works
Addicted to answers: need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., & Kossowska, M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2308 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Goreis, A., & Voracek, M. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F., & Jost, J. T. (2020) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12681 · Cited by 294 · see citing works
Georgiou, N., Delfabbro, P., & Balzan, R. P. (2020) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2020.110201 · Cited by 291 · see citing works
“According to Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham (2014), conspiracy theories (CTs) can be de fi ned as a set of “ false beliefs in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a plot by multiple actors working together with a clear goal in mind, often lawfully and in secret ”…”
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2494 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Too special to be duped: need for uniqueness motivates conspiracy beliefs
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. K. (2017) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2265 · Cited by 260 · see citing works
Sallam, M., Dababseh, D., Yaseen, A. I. B., Al-Haidar, A., Ababneh, N. A., Bakri, F. G., & Mahafzah, A. M. (2020) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph17144915 · Cited by 259 · see citing works
“81 Such beliefs can have negative health and social effects which were seen in the past and continue to 82 exist to this day [23].”
BackgroundStåhl, T., & van Prooijen, J.-W. (2018) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.026 · Cited by 245 · see citing works
“…are driven by the extent to which people view epistemic rationality as important for them personally. unfounded beliefs did not control for CA (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2011; Swami et al., 2014; for an exception, see Pennycook et al., 2012).”
BackgroundPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Bagó, B., & Rand, D. (2021) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672211023652 · Cited by 197 · see citing works
“…(as opposed to relying more on their intuitions) are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015), and vaccination (Sarathchandra et al., 2018) and are less likely to believe in superstitions (Pennycook et al., 2012), conspiracies (Swami et al., 2014), and fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b).”
BackgroundAn Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories
van Prooijen, J. (2019) · European Psychologist · doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000381 · Cited by 237 · see citing works
Browne, M., Thomson, P., Rockloff, M., & Pennycook, G. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0132562 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
“While there is evidence for an indirect role as CRT performance successfully predicted scepticism about CAMs and an analytic cognitive style has been associated with spiritual [59], religious [60], paranormal [56], and conspiratorial [61] thinking, the lack of direct association nonetheless suggests that negative atti…”
BackgroundSwami, V., Furnham, A. F., Smyth, N., Weis, L., Lay, A., & Clow, A. (2016) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.04.084 · Cited by 219 · see citing works
“Although this is comparable to other studies (e.g., thinking styles account for 8% of the variance in belief in conspiracy theories; Swami et al., 2014), it does point to neglected variables that could contribute to a fuller picture of the antecedents of conspiracist ideation.”
BackgroundResultMeasuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Validation of a French and English Single-Item Scale
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M. (2016) · International Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.5334/irsp.8 · Cited by 187 · see citing works
Nan, X., Wang, Y., & Thier, K. (2022) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.115398 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda
Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.003 · Cited by 284 · see citing works
Actively open-minded thinking in politics
Baron, J. (2018) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.10.004 · Cited by 199 · see citing works
Alper, S., Bayrak, F., & Yilmaz, O. (2021) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-020-00903-0 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
Changing Conspiracy Beliefs through Rationality and Ridiculing
Orosz, G., Krekó, P., Paskuj, B., Tóth-Király, I., Bőthe, B., & Roland-Lévy, C. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01525 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
“Most of the existing studies regarding the nature of conspiracy theories are descriptive; moreover, experimental research exploring the possibility of CT belief change is very rare (Banas and Miller, 2013; Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundSwami, V., Barron, D. S., Weis, L., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., & Furnham, A. (2017) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617 · Cited by 159 · see citing works
“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M. (2017) · Social Psychology · doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000306 · Cited by 176 · see citing works
Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories
Pierre, J. M. (2020) · Journal of Social and Political Psychology · doi:10.5964/jspp.v8i2.1362 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
Cognitive reflection correlates with behavior on Twitter
Mosleh, M., Pennycook, G., Arechar, A. A., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-20043-0 · Cited by 175 · see citing works
Epistemic beliefs’ role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation
Garrett, R. K., & Weeks, B. E. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0184733 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2020) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500007439 · Cited by 168 · see citing works
Beyond “Monologicality”? Exploring Conspiracist Worldviews
Franks, B., Bangerter, A., Bauer, M. W., Hall, M., & Noort, M. C. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00861 · Cited by 166 · see citing works
“, 2016), an effect that may be explained by the general negative correlation between belief in CTs and analytic processing style (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundResultIndividual difference factors and beliefs in medical and political conspiracy theories
Galliford, N., & Furnham, A. F. (2017) · Scandinavian Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/sjop.12382 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis
Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2018) · European Review of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/10463283.2018.1537428 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
Rutjens, B. T., Heine, S. J., Sutton, R. M., & van Harreveld, F. (2017) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.08.001 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
“interventions that focus on the development of analytical thinking skills, may ultimately prove effective (Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2013).”
The dark side of meaning-making: How social exclusion leads to superstitious thinking
Graeupner, D., & Coman, A. (2017) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2016.10.003 · Cited by 162 · see citing works
Deppe, K. D., Gonzalez, F. J., Neiman, J. L., Jacobs, C. M., Pahlke, J., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500005131 · Cited by 164 · see citing works
“Additionally, we experimentally investigate whether political attitudes can be manipulated by priming intuition or reflection—something that no published study we are aware of has yet attempted (but see Swami et al., 2014, on manipulating conspiracist ideation).”
March, E., & Springer, J. (2019) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0225964 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
“Although some conspiracy theories may be considered harmless, research has shown that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with negative social, health, and civic outcomes [2], including more acceptance of violent behaviour [3] and a decrease in prosocial behaviour [4].”
BackgroundHornsey, M. J., Lobera, J. A., & Díaz‐Catalán, C. (2020) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113019 · Cited by 146 · see citing works
Bentall, R. P., Lloyd, A., Bennett, K., McKay, R., Mason, L., Murphy, J., McBride, O., Hartman, T. K., Gibson-Miller, J., Levita, L., et al. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0246339 · Cited by 138 · see citing works
Believing in Conspiracy Theories: Evidence from an Exploratory Analysis of Italian Survey Data
Mancosu, M., Vassallo, S., & Vezzoni, C. (2017) · South European Society & Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2017.1359894 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
Pytlik, N., Soll, D., & Mehl, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2020.568942 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
“This finding is in line with prior results indicating a close association of both constructs (37, 38).”
InfluentialThe efficacy of interventions in reducing belief in conspiracy theories: A systematic review
O'Mahony, C., Brassil, M., Murphy, G., & Linehan, C. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0280902 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
“Some priming interventions seek to alter one’s cognition by administering tasks that increase focus and analytical thinking [25].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFacts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation
Keller, D., & Leerssen, P. (2020) · Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) · doi:10.1017/9781108890960
Intention Seekers: Conspiracist Ideation and Biased Attributions of Intentionality
Brotherton, R., & French, C. C. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124125 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Kim, S., & Kim, S. (2020) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph18010266 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
“Beliefs in conspiracy theories are positively related to intuitive rather than analytic thinking [37].”
BackgroundRomer, D., & Jamieson, K. H. (2021) · Journal of Medical Internet Research · doi:10.2196/25215 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
“…terrorist attack [6,7], have been a focus of study in the political science literature, which regards such beliefs as ones “in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a plot by multiple actors working together with a clear goal in mind, often unlawfully and in secret” [8].”
Rizeq, J., Flora, D., & Toplak, M. E. (2020) · Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2020.1759688 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
“…one ’ s initial or preferred conclusion and beliefs (Baron et al., 2015, 2016; Stanovich et al., 2016), has been shown to be negatively associated with anti-science attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and paranormal beliefs (Stanovich et al., 2016; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b; Swami et al., 2014).”
Siegel, A. A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.005 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Adam‐Troian, J., Wagner‐Egger, P., Motyl, M. S., Arciszewski, T., Imhoff, R., Zimmer, F., Klein, O., Babińska, M., Bangerter, A., Bilewicz, M., et al. (2020) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12716 · Cited by 119 · see citing works
Swami, V., Weis, L., Lay, A., Barron, D. S., & Furnham, A. (2016) · Psychiatry Research · doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2015.12.027 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
“In explanation, it has been suggested that conspiracy theories and anomalous beliefs share features in common (e.g., both overly rely on intuitive-experiential processing of information and lack rigorous, self-generated testing; Swami et al., 2014) and that endorsement of one set of anomalous beliefs (e.”
Influentialvan Prooijen, J. (2016) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2157 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
The entertainment value of conspiracy theories
van Prooijen, J., Ligthart, J., Rosema, S., & Xu, Y. (2021) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12522 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes.
Barron, D. S., Furnham, A., Weis, L., Morgan, K., Towell, T., & Swami, V. (2018) · Psychiatry Research · doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2017.10.001 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
“This is important as it suggests that the findings reported in previous studies (Barron et al., 2014; Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2014; van der Tempel and Alcock, 2015) are relatively robust and remain stable across different samples.”
InfluentialBeliefs in conspiracy theories following ostracism
Poon, K.-T., Chen, Z., & Wong, W.-Y. (2020) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167219898944 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
“In contrast, individuals high in analytical thinking (Swami et al., 2014) and perceived control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) tend to be less likely to endorse conspiracy theories.”
BackgroundOnline communication as a window to conspiracist worldviews
Wood, M. J., & Douglas, K. M. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00836 · Cited by 110 · see citing works
The Conspiracy Mentality Scale
Stojanov, A., & Halberstadt, J. (2019) · Social Psychology · doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000381 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
van der Tempel, J., & Alcock, J. (2015) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2015.03.010 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Tomljenović, H., Bubić, A., & Erceg, N. (2019) · Psychology and Health · doi:10.1080/08870446.2019.1673894 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
Conspiracy Thinking in Europe and America: A Comparative Study
Walter, A., & Drochon, H. (2020) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0032321720972616 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
“Analytical thinking is negatively related to belief in conspiracy theories, as analytical skills enable people to evaluate conspiracy theories more critically, in particular conspiracy theories that defy logic and are not supported by evidence (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundIndividual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories
Hornsey, M., Bierwiaczonek, K., Sassenberg, K., & Douglas, K. M. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00133-0 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Anti-Vaccination Beliefs and Unrelated Conspiracy Theories
Goldberg, Z. J., & Richey, S. (2020) · World Affairs · doi:10.1177/0043820020920554 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
O’Brien, T. C., Palmer, R., & Albarracín, D. (2021) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104184 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Misbehaving in the Corona crisis: The role of anxiety and unfounded beliefs
Erceg, N., Ružojčić, M., & Galić, Z. (2020) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-020-01040-4 · Cited by 100 · see citing works
Cognitive Reflection and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167218783192 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Georgiou, N., Delfabbro, P., & Balzan, R. P. (2019) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2019.109521 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Bridging the great divide: Conspiracy theory research for the 21st century
Bütter, M., & Knight, P. (2015) · Diogenes · doi:10.1177/0392192116669289 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
“Others have conducted experiments to show that belief in potentially harmful conspiracy theories can be reduced with a task that increases analytic thinking (Swami et al., 2014).”
BackgroundPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Bagó, B., & Rand, D. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/zhjkp · Cited by 47 · see citing works
“…(as opposed to relying more on their intuitions) are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015), and vaccination (Sarathchandra et al., 2018) and are less likely to believe in superstitions (Pennycook et al., 2012), conspiracies (Swami et al., 2014), and fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b).”
BackgroundČavojová, V., Šrol, J., & Jurkovič, M. (2019) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3595 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Lantian, A., Bagneux, V., Delouvée, S., & Gauvrit, N. (2021) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3790 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Romer, D., & Jamieson, K. (2021) · Social Science & Medicine (1967) · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114480 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
“, 2017, 2019) whose intent is malign (Swami et al., 2014).”
Norris, P., Garnett, H. A., & Grömping, M. (2019) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2019.1593181 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
“This is particularly prevalent among those with lower cognitive skills (Swami et al. 2014), who may not have an alternative means to make sense of a situation.”
BackgroundNeubauer, A. C. (2021) · Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.intell.2021.101563 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
van Prooijen, J., Rodrigues, T. C., Bunzel, C., Georgescu, O., Komáromy, D., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2022) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12802 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
The detection of political deepfakes
Appel, M., & Prietzel, F. (2022) · Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication · doi:10.1093/jcmc/zmac008 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
“Rand, 2019; 2020) and conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014).”
Factors Related to COVID-19 Preventive Behaviors: A Structural Equation Model
Šuriņa, S., Mārtinsone, K., Perepjolkina, V., Koļesņikova, J., Vainik, U., Ruža, A., Vrubļevska, J., Smirnova, D. A., Fountoulakis, K. Ν., & Rancāns, E. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.676521 · Cited by 106 · see citing works
“…also show negative correlation between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 threat appraisal (H3 supported), and as mentioned in other studies (Swami et al., 2014; Allington et al., 2020; Banai et al., 2020), our research confirms a negative correlation between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and…”
ResultNapolitano, M. G., & Reuter, K. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00441-6 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
Wilson, J. A. (2018) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-018-9956-0 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
“…is similar to Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) who found that men actually had a higher belief in aliens, and who suggested that women show a more intuitive thinking processes than men and that intuitive thinking has been associated with increased belief in non-empirical subjects (Swami et al. 2014).”
InfluentialFake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines
Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/29b4j · Cited by 593 · see citing works
Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Stanley, M. L., Barr, N., Peters, K., & Seli, P. (2020) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2020.1813806 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
“…on the CRT are less likely to hold paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012), less likely to believe that conspiracy theories are veridical (Swami et al., 2014), better at differentiating real and fake news reports (Bronstein et al., 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2020), and less likely to find…”
BackgroundGerts, D., Shelley, C. D., Parikh, N., Pitts, T., Ross, C. W., Fairchild, G. C., Chavez, N. Y. V., & Daughton, A. R. (2021) · JMIR Public Health and Surveillance · doi:10.2196/26527 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
“These observations are consistent with prior studies that showed that people who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to also believe in others or are more broadly prone to conspiratorial thinking [60,61].”
Is It All a Conspiracy? Conspiracy Theories and People’s Attitude to COVID-19 Vaccination
Yang, Z., Luo, X., & Jia, H. (2021) · Vaccines · doi:10.3390/vaccines9101051 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Hart, J., & Graether, M. (2018) · Journal of Individual Differences · doi:10.1027/1614-0001/a000268 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement
Stanovich, K. E., & Toplak, M. E. (2023) · Journal of Intelligence · doi:10.3390/jintelligence11020027 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
- Authors
- Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Westminster (GB)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Swami, Viren
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-12
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 572-585
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1965444852
- Cited by
- 726
- References
- 105
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 77 · 2024: 81 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 122 · 2021: 100 · 2020: 94 · 2019: 43 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 15
- FWCI
- 55.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nbn-resolving.de
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- WestminsterResearch (University of Westminster) (acceptedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- conspiracy theories, analytical thinking, conspiracist ideation, intuitive thinking, open-mindedness, verbal fluency
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Culture, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Personality, Thinking, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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