The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection
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Cited by
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Lay beliefs in moral expertise
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Metadata
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-08
- Volume
- 141
- Pages
- 127-137
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163349776
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 16.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.