A decision network account of reasoning about other people’s choices
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The ability to predict and reason about other people's choices is fundamental to social interaction. We propose that people reason about other people's choices using mental models that are similar to decision networks. Decision networks are extensions of Bayesian networks that incorporate the idea that choices are made in order to achieve goals. In our first experiment, we explore how people predict the choices of others. Our remaining three experiments explore how people infer the goals and knowledge of others by observing the choices that they make. We show that decision networks account for our data better than alternative computational accounts that do not incorporate the notion of goal-directed choice or that do not rely on probabilistic inference.
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Cites
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Cited by
Building machines that learn and think like people
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Visual cognition in multimodal large language models
Schulze Buschoff, L. M., Akata, E., Bethge, M., & Schulz, E. (2025) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-024-00963-y · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- Jern, A., & Kemp, C.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 142
- Pages
- 12-38
- ISSN
- 0010-0277
- OpenAlex
- W244491643
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 15
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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