Where do hypotheses come from?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why are human inferences sometimes remarkably close to the Bayesian ideal and other times systematically biased? In particular, why do humans make near-rational inferences in some natural domains where the candidate hypotheses are explicitly available, whereas tasks in similar domains requiring the self-generation of hypotheses produce systematic deviations from rational inference. We propose that these deviations arise from algorithmic processes approximating Bayes' rule. Specifically in our account, hypotheses are generated stochastically from a sampling process, such that the sampled hypotheses form a Monte Carlo approximation of the posterior. While this approximation will converge to the true posterior in the limit of infinite samples, we take a small number of samples as we expect that the number of samples humans take is limited. We show that this model recreates several well-documented experimental findings such as anchoring and adjustment, subadditivity, superadditivity, the crowd within as well as the self-generation effect, the weak evidence, and the dud alternative effects. We confirm the model's prediction that superadditivity and subadditivity can be induced within the same paradigm by manipulating the unpacking and typicality of hypotheses. We also partially confirm our model's prediction about the effect of time pressure and cognitive load on these effects.
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Cites
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Natural Image Statistics and Neural Representation
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“Participants subsequently had to guess the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Participants who saw the wheel stopping on 10 guessed lower values than participants whose wheel stopped at 65. This and other findings led Tversky and Kahneman (1974) to hypothesize the ‘‘anchoring and adjustment” heuris…”
BackgroundResultHomo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
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Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games
Frank, M. C., & Goodman, N. D. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1218633 · Cited by 868 · cited 1×
“…ev deviatio PðhjdÞ ¼ PðdjhÞPðhÞP h02HPðdjh0ÞPðh0Þ : ð1Þ Many studies have found that when H is supplied explicitly, humans can come close to the Bayesian ideal (e.g. Frank & Goodman, 2012; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephan, 2015).2…”
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Cited by
Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892
The Generative Adversarial Brain
Gershman, S. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2019.00018 · Cited by 89
Self-citationA theory of learning to infer.
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2020) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000178 · Cited by 70
Self-citationMeta-learned models of cognition
Binz, M., Dasgupta, I., Jagadish, A. K., Botvinick, M., Wang, J. X., & Schulz, E. (2024) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x23003266 · Cited by 38
Self-citationAmortized Hypothesis Generation
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Goodman, N. D., & Gershman, S. J. (2017) · doi:10.1101/137190 · Cited by 7
“Accordingly, response time and cognitive resource availability modulate the effect size (Dasgupta et al., 2016).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., & Gershman, S. J.
- Venue
- Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-08
- Volume
- 96
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 0010-0285 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2555988050
- Cited by
- 95
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 6.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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