Early intention understandings that are common to primates predict children's later theory of mind
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Summary Intention understanding emerges early in human development, manifest in deep and robust fashions even in infants. Overlapping intention understandings, encompassing agents as intentional actors and experiencers, are evident in nonhuman primates in more limited fashions. Intention understandings, of the sort shared by infants and nonhuman primates, predict the more comprehensive theory-of-mind understandings of older children. Those early understandings provide a platform for the ontogenesis of further, deeper achievements in the human case.
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Citations
Cites
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 · Cited by 1,592
Barber (2005) · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5834.2005.00365.x · Cited by 1,063
Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging
Saxe, R., Carey, S., & Kanwisher, N. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044 · Cited by 726
Exponential Decline of Deep-Sea Ecosystem Functioning Linked to Benthic Biodiversity Loss
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Infant attention to intentional action predicts preschool theory of mind.
Wellman, H. M., Lopez-Duran, S., LaBounty, J., & Hamilton, B. (2008) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.2.618 · Cited by 195
Self-citationInfants’ reasoning about others’ false perceptions
Song, H.-J., & Baillargeon, R. (2008) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0013774 · Cited by 179 · cited 1×
“Indeed, some research concludes that even infants understand false beliefs [13,14].”
BackgroundInfants' understanding of object-directed action
Phillips, A. T., & Wellman, H. M. (2005) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2004.11.005 · Cited by 130
Self-citation
Cited by
Dricu, M., & Frühholz, S. (2016) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.020 · Cited by 102
Preschool children fail primate prosocial game because of attentional task demands
Burkart, J. M., & Rueth, K. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068440 · Cited by 45
“Some of these abilities are likely to be present in most nonhuman primates (reviewed in [58,59,74]) whereas others, such as mirror self-recognition, can only be found in great apes, but not monkeys [34], including callitrichids [36].”
BackgroundSteklis, H. D., & Lane, R. D. (2012) · The Science of the Mind · doi:10.1007/978-4-431-54123-3_8 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Wellman, H. M., & Brandone, A. C.
- Venue
- Current Opinion in Neurobiology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-62
- ISSN
- 0959-4388 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047045073
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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