Post-decision wagering measures metacognitive content, not sensory consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A recent report by Persaud et al. [Persaud, N., McLeod, P. & Cowey, A. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness. Nature Neuroscience 10, 257-261] addresses a fundamental issue in consciousness science: the experimental measurement of conscious content. The authors propose a novel technique, 'post-decision wagering', in which subjects place bets on the correctness of decisions or discriminations. In this note, I critique the authors' claim that their method "measures awareness directly".
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Citations
Cites
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 2×
“, 2005a) and explicit theoretical frameworks (Crick & Koch, 2003; Seth, Izhikevich, Reeke, & Edelman, 2006; Tononi, 2004), that together point to necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness in humans and non-humans alike.”
BackgroundCrick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492 · cited 2×
“…(including PDW), neurophysiological and neuroanatomical evidence (Edelman et al., 2005; Seth et al., 2005a) and explicit theoretical frameworks (Crick & Koch, 2003; Seth, Izhikevich, Reeke, & Edelman, 2006; Tononi, 2004), that together point to necessary and sufficient conditions for…”
BackgroundPost-decision wagering objectively measures awareness
Persaud, N., McLeod, P., & Cowey, A. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1840 · Cited by 454 · cited 1×
“In a recent article, Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey (2007) claim that their novel method of post-decision wagering (PDW) ''measures awareness directly'' but, unfortunately, the situation is not as straightforward as they suggest.”
BackgroundIdentifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species
Edelman, D. B., Baars, B. J., & Seth, A. K. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.09.001 · Cited by 209
Self-citation
Cited by
Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans, A., Overgaard, M., & Pessoa, L. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008 · Cited by 458
Self-citationMeasuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., & Cleeremans, A. (2010) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.013 · Cited by 443
The subjective experience of emotion: a fearful view
LeDoux, J. E., & Hofmann, S. G. (2018) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.09.011 · Cited by 268
“People can typically give either a verbal or a nonverbal report of information to which they have introspective access, but cannot provide a verbal report of information that is only processed non-consciously [6,14,15].”
BackgroundThe Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
The rise of machine consciousness: Studying consciousness with computational models
Reggia, J. A. (2013) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2013.03.011 · Cited by 199
“Metacognitive networks based on post-decision wagering provide a well-defined, concrete framework within which to study the implications of HOT theories, regardless of the extent to which such wagering is or is not a direct measure of awareness (Persaud, Mcleod, & Cowey, 2008; Seth, 2008).”
BackgroundDienes, Z., & Seth, A. (2010) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.009 · Cited by 158
“…our results are still important for establishing the presence of reflexive, ‘higher-order’, meta-, or introspective-consciousness, although on this view neither gambling performance nor confidence ratings can be taken as necessary for conscious knowledge per se (Seth, 2008, see Seth et al., 2008).”
BackgroundSelf-citationIndicators and criteria of consciousness in animals and intelligent machines: an inside-out approach
Pennartz, C. M. A., Farisco, M., & Evers, K. (2019) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2019.00025 · Cited by 121
“This confound is also at play when considering the wider literature on metacognitive judgments in the context of perception, stimulus valuation and consciousness (for examples in the literature on humans, rodents or birds; see Persaud et al., 2007; Kepecs et al., 2008; Seth, 2008; van Wingerden et al., 2012; Watanabe…”
Know thyself: Metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness
Pasquali, A., Timmermans, B., & Cleeremans, A. (2010) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.010 · Cited by 102
“Conversely, when they fail to place advantageous wagers, that is, when wagering is independent from above-chance performance, one may conclude that the knowledge that drives performance is unconscious (e.g., Seth, 2008).”
BackgroundConsciousness and metarepresentation: A computational sketch
Cleeremans, A., Timmermans, B., & Pasquali, A. (2007) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.011 · Cited by 91
Irvine, E. (2013) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12016 · Cited by 72
Kinds of Access: Different Methods for Report Reveal Different Kinds of Metacognitive Access
Overgaard, M., & Sandberg, K. (2014) · The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45190-4_4 · Cited by 9
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Seth, A. K.
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 981-983
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2078729512
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 5.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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