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Cited by 41Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentSocial and Intergroup PsychologyPersonality Traits and Psychology

Deconstructing moral character judgments

Hartman, Rachel, Blakey, Will, Gray, Kurt·2022·Current Opinion in Psychology
DOI 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008
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Abstract

People often make judgments of others' moral character - an inferred moral essence that presumably predicts moral behavior. We first define moral character and explore why people make character judgments before outlining three key elements that drive character judgments: behavior (good vs. bad, norm violations, and deliberation), mind (intentions, explanations, capacities), and identity (appearance, social groups, and warmth). We also provide taxonomy of moral character that goes beyond simply good vs. evil. Drawing from the theory of dyadic morality, we outline a two-dimensional triangular space of character judgments (valence and strength/agency), with three key corners - heroes, villains, and victims. Varieties of perceived moral character include saints and demons, strivers/sinners and opportunists, the nonmoral, virtuous, and culpable victims, and pure victims.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008

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72 of 72 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Making character judgments about others requires inferences about their minds, including intentions and moral capacities.

    “This is because when making character judgments about others, one must make inferences about their minds, which includes making inferences about their intentions and moral capacities [29].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [29]

  • A person judged to be 'evil' will probably be perceived as more likely to do evil things, while a person judged to be 'good' will probably be perceived as more likely to do good things.

    “For example, a person judged to be 'evil' will probably be perceived as more likely to do evil things, while a person judged to be 'good' will probably be perceived as more likely to do good things [29].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [29]

  • Normally, the perceived mind of others disqualifies nonhuman entities from being the subject of moral character judgments.

    “Normally, the second criteria for making character judgments-the perceived mind of others-disqualifies nonhuman entities from being the subject of moral character judgments [29].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [29]

  • Moral character judgments typically involve at least three sources of information: about another's behavior, their perceived mind and their identity.

    “it typically involves, at least, three sources of information: about another's behavior, their perceived mind and their identity [29].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [29]

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Authors
Hartman, R., Blakey, W., & Gray, K.
Affiliations
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
Corresponding author
Gray, Kurt
ORCID
Venue
Current Opinion in Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2022-02
Volume
43
Pages
205-212
ISSN
2352-250X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.008
OpenAlex
W3188908027
Cited by
41
References
71
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 2
FWCI
0.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Current Opinion in Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Charles Koch Foundation
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Personality Traits and Psychology
Keywords
moral character judgments, agency, intention, moral explanation, social identity, warmth, norm violation, deliberation, victims, heroes and villains
MeSH terms
Humans, Judgment, Morals, Social Perception, Intention

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