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Cited by 583

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

Open access
Ferraro, Paul J. · 2008 · Ecological Economics

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029

Cites

28 of 28 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 22

  1. Bogetoft, 2000, DEA and activity planning under asymmetric information, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13, 7, 10.1023/A:1007812822633 · DOI
  2. Bourgeon, 1995, An incentive approach to land set-aside programmes, European Economic Review, 39, 1478, 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00016-7 · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00016-7
  3. Cason, 2003, A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 446, 10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00026-3 · DOI
  4. Chambers, 1992, On the design of agricultural policy mechanisms, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74, 646, 10.2307/1242577 · doi:10.2307/1242577
  5. Choe, 1998, A note on imperfect monitoring of agri-environmental policy, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 49, 250, 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1998.tb01267.x · doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.1998.tb01267.x
  6. Economist, 1999, Saved, at a price, Economist, 350, 30
  7. Fraser, 1995, An analysis of management agreement bargaining under asymmetric information, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 46, 20, 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1995.tb00749.x · doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.1995.tb00749.x
  8. Fraser, 2002, Moral hazard and risk management in agri-environmental policy, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53, 475, 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2002.tb00033.x · doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.2002.tb00033.x
  9. Hart, 2004, Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes — a multiple-agent approach, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 32, 75, 10.1093/erae/jbi002 · doi:10.1093/erae/jbi002
  10. Kremer, 2004, Divisible-good auctions: the role of allocation rules, Rand Journal of Economics, 35, 147, 10.2307/1593734 · doi:10.2307/1593734
  11. Latacz-Lohmann, 2005, Auctions for conservation contracts: a review of the theoretical and empirical literature
  12. McKee, 2001, Balancing army and endangered species concerns: Green vs Green, Environmental Management, 27, 123, 10.1007/s002670010138 · DOI
  13. Moxey, 1999, Efficient contract design for agri-environmental policy, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50, 187, 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x · doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x
  14. Ozanne, 2001, Moral hazard, risk aversion and compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 28, 329, 10.1093/erae/28.3.329 · doi:10.1093/erae/28.3.329
  15. Parks, 1995, Explaining “irrational” land use: risk aversion and marginal agricultural land, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28, 34, 10.1006/jeem.1995.1003 · doi:10.1006/jeem.1995.1003
  16. Peterson, 2004, Incentive-compatible pollution control policies under asymmetric information on both risk preferences and technology, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86, 291, 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00579.x · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00579.x
  17. Riley, 1981, Optimal auctions, American Economic Review, 71, 381
  18. Schilizzi, 2006, Bidding for conservation contracts: experimental validation of a budget-constrained tendering model, 10.1596/1813-9450-3895 · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3895
  19. Shoemaker, 1989, Agricultural land values and rents under the conservation reserve program, Land Economics, 65, 131, 10.2307/3146787 · doi:10.2307/3146787
  20. Wang, 2002, Auctioning divisible goods, Economic Theory, 19, 673, 10.1007/s001990100191 · doi:10.1007/s001990100191
  21. White, 2002, Designing voluntary agri-environmental policy with hidden and hidden action: a note, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53, 353
  22. Wu, 1996, Contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 935, 10.2307/1243850 · doi:10.2307/1243850

Cited by

See all 583

Metadata

Authors
Ferraro, P. J.
Venue
Ecological Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-05
Volume
65
Issue
4
Pages
810-821
ISSN
0921-8009 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2011358054
Cited by
583
References
28
FWCI
22.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.