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Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services
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Cited by
Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., & Wunder, S. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.011 · Cited by 2,466
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Bringing Ecosystem Services into Economic Decision-Making: Land Use in the United Kingdom
Bateman, I. J., Harwood, A. R., Mace, G. M., Watson, R. T., Abson, D. J., Andrews, B., Binner, A., Crowe, A., Day, B. H., Dugdale, S., et al. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1234379 · Cited by 1,031
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Show Me the Money: Do Payments Supply Environmental Services in Developing Countries?
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ferraro, P. J.
- Venue
- Ecological Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 810-821
- ISSN
- 0921-8009 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2011358054
- Cited by
- 583
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 22.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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