The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
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“Further, several studies have found that people tend to be more selfish when the stakes of the game increase”
From Personality Psychology and Economics (2011) · cites this paper as Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks [2005]
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Citations
Cites
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. E. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998575 · Cited by 512 · cited 2×
“At high stakes, proposers’ behavior shows little change, but responders tend to reduce the threshold below which they reject offers (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2003).”
BackgroundOn expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (1996) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf02425259 · Cited by 356
Cited by
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,783
Personality Psychology and Economics
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J., & Kautz, T. (2011) · Handbook of the Economics of Education · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53444-6.00001-8 · Cited by 1,204
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 · Cited by 955
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2005) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00426.x · Cited by 588
Personality Psychology and Economics
Almlund, M., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J., & Kautz, T. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16822 · Cited by 540
Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation
Fowler, J. H., & Kam, C. D. (2007) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00577.x · Cited by 496
Economic games on the internet: the effect of $1 stakes
Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031461 · Cited by 364
Wang, L., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011) · Academy of Management Learning & Education · doi:10.5465/amle.2009.0185 · Cited by 343
On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study
Galizzi, M. M., & Navarro-Martinez, D. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908 · Cited by 270
Currency value moderates equity preference among young children
Blake, P. R., & Rand, D. G. (2010) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.012 · Cited by 269
Social Preferences: Some Thoughts from the Field
List, J. A. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142958 · Cited by 61
Barreiro-Hurle, J., Dessart, F. J., Rommel, J., Czajkowski, M., Espinosa-Goded, M., Rodriguez-Entrena, M., Thomas, F., & Zagorska, K. (2023) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2023.102481 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Carpenter, J., Verhoogen, E., & Burks, S.
- Venue
- Economics Letters
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 393-398
- ISSN
- 0165-1765 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118993558
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 22.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.