Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development
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Citations
Cites
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“The relevance of this rationale to corrupt activities has also been emphasised by Barreto (2000) and Blackburn et al. (2006), who link the cost of corrupt behaviour to the incidence of corruption.4 Despite being highlighted as an important channel, the possible implications of the link between rent…”
BackgroundEconomic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
Leff, N. H. (1964) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/000276426400800303 · Cited by 2,568
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“1 For example, see inter alia Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Liu (1985, 1996), Fisman and Svensson (2007), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Ali and Isse (2003), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Bardhan (1997), Mauro (1995), Aidt (2003), Abed and Gupta (2002).”
BackgroundAn Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
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“1 For example, see inter alia Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Liu (1985, 1996), Fisman and Svensson (2007), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Ali and Isse (2003), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Bardhan (1997), Mauro (1995), Aidt (2003), Abed and Gupta (2002).”
BackgroundPersistence of power, Elites, and institutions
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“For example, studies by Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Rauch and Evans (2000), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) find that there is a significant negative relationship between the level of corruption and the level of economic development…”
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
Aidt, T. S. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00171.x · Cited by 1,192
Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?
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Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
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“Whereas, Blackburn et al. (2006), Dreher et al. (in press), Dreher and Gassebner (2007), Guriev (2004), Svensson (2003), and Kaufmann and Wei (1999) corruption imposes a significant burden on private agents.”
BackgroundIncome tax evasion: A theoretical analysis
Yitzhaki, S. (1974) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1 · Cited by 944
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“For example, Méon and Weill (2010) and, Aidt et al. (2008)find that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency and growth in countries where institutions are weak.”
WHY DON'T POOR COUNTRIES CATCH UP? A CROSS‐NATIONAL TEST OF AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
KEEFER, P., & KNACK, S. (1997) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb02035.x · Cited by 827 · cited 3×
“Keefer and Knack (1997); Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008); Knack and Keefer (1995), and Aidt (2009) only empirically examine the effect of governance on the relationship between corruption and the efficiency of public spending.”
BackgroundThe Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.194 · Cited by 822
Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?
Rajkumar, A. S., & Swaroop, V. (2008) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.08.003 · Cited by 737
Corruption, institutions, and economic development
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“…particular, if government size is related to the degree of government intervention and the inefficiencies induced by it, then, an increase in government size creates more room for rent-seeking and corruption (for example, see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Goel and Nelson, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).”
BackgroundVan Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. (2001) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00139-0 · Cited by 660 · cited 1×
“For example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2008) and Panizza (2001) find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative civil-service pay and corruption in regressions based on cross-country averages.”
BackgroundCorruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa
Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2002) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/s101010200045 · Cited by 660
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“…particular, if government size is related to the degree of government intervention and the inefficiencies induced by it, then, an increase in government size creates more room for rent-seeking and corruption (for example, see Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Goel and Nelson, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).”
BackgroundAndvig, J. C., & Moene, K. O. (1990) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-g · Cited by 546
Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?
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“Whereas, Blackburn et al. (2006), Dreher et al. (in press), Dreher and Gassebner (2007), Guriev (2004), Svensson (2003), and Kaufmann and Wei (1999) corruption imposes a significant burden on private agents.”
Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances
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“For example, Yitzhaki (1974) has shown analytically that tax evasion decreases with tax rates in a standard neoclassical model.”
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Corruption and military spending
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How Corruption Affects Productivity
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003) · Kyklos · doi:10.1046/j.0023-5962.2003.00233.x · Cited by 423
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“7 For example, Mauro (1998), Delavallade (2006), Kagundu (2006), Devarajan et al. (1996), Keefer and Knack (2002), Gupta et al. (2001), Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), and de la Croix and Delavallade (2009) have shown that corruption distorts the effectiveness of public spending.”
BackgroundInfluentialCorruption, extortion and evasion
Hindriks, J., Keen, M., & Muthoo, A. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00030-4 · Cited by 400 · cited 2×
“For example, Hindriks et al. (1999), and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) have discussed about such interactions between taxpayers and tax inspectors. Following Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009), it is assumed that there is no legal cost involved for the private agent in order to get the licence, except for the cost of m…”
BackgroundCorruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (1998) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1004900603583 · Cited by 399
Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels
Pellegrini, L., & Gerlagh, R. (2004) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00261.x · Cited by 389 · cited 3×
“1 For example, see inter alia Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Liu (1985, 1996), Fisman and Svensson (2007), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Ali and Isse (2003), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Bardhan (1997), Mauro (1995), Aidt (2003), Abed and Gupta (2002).”
BackgroundInfluential2 Fiscal Policy, Expenditure Composition, and Growth in Low-Income Countries
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Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison
Ali, A. M., & Isse, H. S. (2003) · Cato Journal · Cited by 322
The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
Blackburn, K., Bose, N., & Emranul Haque, M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2005.07.007 · Cited by 304
Corruption and distribution of public spending in developing countries
Delavallade, C. (2006) · Journal of Economics and Finance · doi:10.1007/bf02761488 · Cited by 302
Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption?
Billger, S. M., & Goel, R. K. (2009) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.07.006 · Cited by 291 · cited 1×
“For example, studies by Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Rauch and Evans (2000), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) find that there is a significant negative relationship between the level of corruption and the level of economic development…”
Corruption and optimal law enforcement
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2001) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00127-4 · Cited by 283
Butkiewicz, J. L., & Yanikkaya, H. (2006) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2006.03.004 · Cited by 270
Guriev, S. (2004) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.06.001 · Cited by 269
Corruption, inequality, and fairness
Alesina, A., & Angeletos, G.-M. (2005) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.003 · Cited by 261
Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public investment Hurts Growth
Fund, I. M. (1998) · Economic issues · doi:10.5089/9781557757104.051 · Cited by 233 · cited 2×
“1 For example, see inter alia Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Liu (1985, 1996), Fisman and Svensson (2007), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Ali and Isse (2003), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), Bardhan (1997), Mauro (1995), Aidt (2003), Abed and Gupta (2002).”
BackgroundPublic Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government
Hillman, A. L. (2003) · Cited by 229
Cowell, F. A., & P.F. Gordon, J. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90013-8 · Cited by 216
Corruption and competition in procurement
Celentani, M., & Ganuza, J.-J. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00147-7 · Cited by 205
Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth
de Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2011) · Review of Development Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00596.x · Cited by 185 · cited 2×
“Unlike the paper of de Vaal and Ebben (2011), 3 Nevertheless, Aidt (2009) argues that these results may not be robust because they depend on the choice of the dummy variables; and also intuitively it is hard to accept that in countries with strong institutions, at low levels, corruption may be…”
BackgroundGrowth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions
de la Croix, D., & Delavallade, C. (2008) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/s10101-008-0057-4 · Cited by 173
Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?
Blackburn, K., & Forgues-Puccio, G. F. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.009 · Cited by 171
Tax evasion in a model of endogenous growth
Chen, B.-L. (2003) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/s1094-2025(03)00002-4 · Cited by 144
Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers
Hillman, A. L., & Katz, E. (1987) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(87)90016-8 · Cited by 141
Endogenous corruption in economic development
Blackburn, K., Bose, N., & Haque, M. E. (2010) · Journal of Economic Studies · doi:10.1108/01443581011012234 · Cited by 140
Karras, G. (1996) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01372.x · Cited by 129
Lui, F. T. (1996) · Contemporary Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1996.tb00621.x · Cited by 121
Economic growth with an optimal public spending composition
Chen, B.-L. (2006) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpi045 · Cited by 112 · cited 1×
“In fact, analysing tax evasion Cowell (1990), Chen (2003), andHillman (2009) explain that rent seeking costs arise because tax evaders have to hire experts and lawyers to conceal their illegally obtained income.”
BackgroundHow corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty
Ryvkin, D., & Serra, D. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.004 · Cited by 102
Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model
Barreto, R. A. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00052-x · Cited by 101 · cited 2×
“6 To account fully for the economic effect of the public sector it is essential to consider the benefits provided by the public sector along with the burden imposed by it (Barro, 1990; Cowell and Gordon, 1988).”
BackgroundDistribution and development in a model of misgovernance
Blackburn, K., & Forgues‐Puccio, G. F. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.10.003 · Cited by 96 · cited 2×
“…setting.2 According to this rationale, the institutional structure determines the degree of organisation of corruption, which then impacts on the income uncertainty faced by the private agents and thus on the economic performance (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).”
BackgroundDzhumashev, R. (2013) · Contemporary Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/coep.12025 · Cited by 91
Self-citationDreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2007) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005389461 · Cited by 82
TAX SHELTERING AND THE COST OF EVASION *
Cowell, F. (1990) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041937 · Cited by 80
Corruption and economic growth: A meta-analysis of the evidence on low-income countries and beyond
Uğur, M., & Dasgupta, N. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 77
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*
Blackburn, K., Bose, N., & Haque, M. E. (2011) · Manchester School · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02168.x · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“The statistical evidence by Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) supports this tenet by demonstrating that the correlation between corruption and different measures of the quality of governance is consistently negative.”
BackgroundCorruption clubs: endogenous thresholds in corruption and development
Haque, M. E., & Kneller, R. (2009) · Economics of Governance · doi:10.1007/s10101-009-0064-0 · Cited by 66
Public Sector Wages and Bureaucratic Quality: Evidence from Latin America
Panizza, U. G. (2001) · Economía · doi:10.1353/eco.2001.0015 · Cited by 64 · cited 2×
“For example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2008) and Panizza (2001) find evidence of a statistically”
BackgroundThe quality of institutions: A genetic programming approach
Álvarez‐Díaz, M., & Míguez, G. C. (2007) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2007.05.001 · Cited by 30 · cited 2×
“…the analytical framework employed in this study integrates the aforementioned approaches, thereby making it more general.5 First, following Andvig and Moene (1990), Ryvkin and Serra (2012), Haque and Kneller (2009), and Blackburn et al. (2006), the framework incorporates the idea that the…”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Cited by
How Does Corruption Affect Public Debt? An Empirical Analysis
Cooray, A., Dzhumashev, R., & Schneider, F. (2017) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.020 · Cited by 217
“Moreover, Dzhumashev (2014b) demonstrates that high levels of corruption and public spending can reinforce each other and thus result in perpetuation of large public expenditures.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dzhumashev, R.
- Venue
- Economic Modelling
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-02
- Volume
- 37
- Pages
- 202-215
- ISSN
- 0264-9993 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1984630030
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 79
- FWCI
- 14.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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