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Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set

Dreher, Axel, Sturm, Jan-Egbert, de Haan, Jakob · 2008 · European Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.04.001

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Berger, 2001, Central bank independence: an update of theory and evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 3, 10.1111/1467-6419.00131 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Chamberlain, 1980, Analysis of covariance with qualitative data, Review of Economic Studies, 47, 225, 10.2307/2297110 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Cukierman, 1995, Political influence on the central bank: international evidence, World Bank Economic Review, 9, 397, 10.1093/wber/9.3.397 · DOI · Paper page
  4. Cukierman, 1992, Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes, World Bank Economic Review, 6, 353, 10.1093/wber/6.3.353 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Dreher, 2007, vol. 143
  6. Forder, 1996, On the assessment and implementation of ‘institutional’ remedies, Oxford Economic Papers, 48, 39, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028560 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Frankel, 2005, Mundell-Fleming lecture: contractionary currency crashes in developing countries, IMF Staff Papers, 52, 149, 10.2307/30035893 · doi:10.2307/30035893
  8. Levy-Yeyati, 2005, Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds vs. words, European Economic Review, 49, 1603, 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.01.001 · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.01.001
  9. Mangano, 1998, Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences, Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 468, 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028657 · DOI
  10. Mirau, 2007, Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence, Public Choice, 133, 297, 10.1007/s11127-007-9189-2 · DOI
  11. Sturm, 2001, Inflation in developing countries: does central bank independence matter?, Ifo Studien, 47, 389

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & de Haan, J.
Venue
European Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-12
Volume
24
Issue
4
Pages
778-787
ISSN
0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2157789578
Cited by
185
References
5
FWCI
24.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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