The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Multi-battle contests
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- Konrad, K. A., & Kovenock, D.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 256-274
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2015094427
- Cited by
- 264
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 17.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.