The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Abstract
Much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game‐ending, costly lottery. This article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse. The model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power. The analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly‐process literature: (i) the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power, (ii) it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty, (iii) it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources, and (iv) it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed.
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Citations
Cites
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Muthoo, A. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511607950 · Cited by 1,162
Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., & Wilson, R. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4 · Cited by 700
Blainey, G. (1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 686
SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION *
VICKERS, J. (1986) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041751 · Cited by 551
In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics
Powell, R. (1999) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213989 · Cited by 540
Self-citationWagner, R. H. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669259 · Cited by 504
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory
Morris, S. (1995) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100003382 · Cited by 501
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Cited by
Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49 · Cited by 772
Powell, R. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061 · Cited by 585
Self-citationDo Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?
Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., & Nordstrom, T. (2004) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2005.0008 · Cited by 321
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Smith, A., & Stam, A. C. (2004) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002704268026 · Cited by 277
Werner, S., & Yuen, A. (2005) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818305050095 · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Powell, R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-03-03
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 344-361
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2129548459
- Cited by
- 333
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 16.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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