Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.
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Cites
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“The players are then allowed to imitate other strategies, preferentially those with a higher payoff (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995; Samuelson, 1997; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006; Sandholm, 2010).”
Self-citationFehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“They are willing to play C, provided the co-player also plays C (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Yamagishi et al., 2005).”
Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life
NOWAK, M. A. (2006) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjghw98 · Cited by 2,438
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395 · cited 2×
“Such outcomes can be enforced in various ways, and under a wide range of circumstances (see, e.g., Friedman, 1971; Aumann, 1981; Aumann and Shapley, 1994; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Kalai, 1990; Myerson, 1991; Mailath and Olszewski, 2011).”
The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race
Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0134966100 · Cited by 169
Cited by
Small Groups and Long Memories Promote Cooperation
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep26889 · Cited by 78
Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 92
- Pages
- 41-52
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W394103507
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 40.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K. (2015). Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
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