The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America
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Self-citation
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Are public–private partnerships a healthy option? A systematic literature review
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The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
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A review of emerging trends in global PPP research: analysis and visualization
Song, J., Zhang, H., & Dong, W. (2016) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-016-1918-1 · Cited by 323
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Decarolis, F., Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., & Spagnolo, G. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24201 · Cited by 88
Metadata
- Authors
- Guasch, J. L., Laffont, J.-J., & Straub, S.
- Venue
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 421-442
- ISSN
- 0167-7187 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1569989538
- Cited by
- 342
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 37.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.