Cited by 322Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsHuman-Automation Interaction and Safety

A naturalistic decision making perspective on studying intuitive decision making.

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Klein, Gary·2015·Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

Abstract

Abstract The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) community defines intuition as based on large numbers of patterns gained through experience, resulting in different forms of tacit knowledge. This view contrasts with Fast and Frugal Heuristics (FFH) researchers, who view intuition in terms of general purpose heuristics. The NDM view also differs from the Heuristics and Biases (HB) community, which sees intuitions as a source of bias and error. Seven suggestions are offered to assist the FFH and H&B communities in improving intuitive decision making and in conducting research that has greater potential for application. Rather than trying to help people analyze which option to choose, the NDM community recommends that intuitions be strengthened by providing a broader experience base that lets people build better tacit knowledge, such as perceptual skills and richer mental models, as a means of achieving better decisions.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.001

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  • Research in Naturalistic Decision Making demonstrates that system 1 thinking, called intuition, is a powerful source of problem solving that often produces better and/or faster decisions than system 2.

    “First, research in Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) demonstrates that 'system 1' thinking, which they call intuition, is a powerful source of problem solving that often produces better and/or faster decisions than system 2 [16].”

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Authors
Klein, G.
Corresponding author
Klein, Gary
Venue
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
Published
2015-09
Volume
4
Issue
3
Pages
164-168
ISSN
  • 2211-3681 (ISSN-L)
  • 2211-369X
OpenAlex
W1154580924
Cited by
322
References
55
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 1
FWCI
10.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition (publishedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Human-Automation Interaction and Safety
Keywords
naturalistic decision making, intuitive decision making, tacit knowledge, fast and frugal heuristics, heuristics and biases, intuition, experience base, perceptual skills, mental models, decision-making

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