Cited by 283Cryptography and Data SecurityCloud Data Security SolutionsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

Private predictive analysis on encrypted medical data

Open access
Bos, Joppe W., Lauter, Kristin, Naehrig, Michael·2014·Journal of Biomedical Informatics

Abstract

Increasingly, confidential medical records are being stored in data centers hosted by hospitals or large companies. As sophisticated algorithms for predictive analysis on medical data continue to be developed, it is likely that, in the future, more and more computation will be done on private patient data. While encryption provides a tool for assuring the privacy of medical information, it limits the functionality for operating on such data. Conventional encryption methods used today provide only very restricted possibilities or none at all to operate on encrypted data without decrypting it first. Homomorphic encryption provides a tool for handling such computations on encrypted data, without decrypting the data, and without even needing the decryption key. In this paper, we discuss possible application scenarios for homomorphic encryption in order to ensure privacy of sensitive medical data. We describe how to privately conduct predictive analysis tasks on encrypted data using homomorphic encryption. As a proof of concept, we present a working implementation of a prediction service running in the cloud (hosted on Microsoft's Windows Azure), which takes as input private encrypted health data, and returns the probability for suffering cardiovascular disease in encrypted form. Since the cloud service uses homomorphic encryption, it makes this prediction while handling only encrypted data, learning nothing about the submitted confidential medical data.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jbi.2014.04.003

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  • Transmission of gradients and partial parameters may lead to indirect privacy leakage.

    “Nevertheless, the system is not sufficiently secure because the transmission of gradients and partial parameters may lead to indirect privacy leakage (Bos et al., 2014).”

    From A review of applications in federated learning (2020) · cites this paper as Bos et al., 2014

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Authors
Bos, J. W., Lauter, K., & Naehrig, M.
Affiliations
Microsoft (United States) (US)
Corresponding author
Lauter, Kristin
Venue
Journal of Biomedical Informatics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2014-08
Volume
50
Pages
234-243
ISSN
1532-0464 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2077905990
Cited by
283
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 4
FWCI
28.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Biomedical Informatics (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
homomorphic encryption, cardiovascular disease prediction, health data privacy, Microsoft Azure
MeSH terms
Proportional Hazards Models, Medical Records Systems, Computerized, Computer Security, Privacy

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