Does migration promote democratization? Evidence from the Mexican transition
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222 · cited 1×
“Another possible explanation would be a variant of the classic Tiebout (1956) model which lets migrants “vote with their feet”.”
BackgroundEconomic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810 · cited 1×
“…that a higher income does not promote a transition to democracy, but rather, prevents countries from falling back into dictatorship once democracy has been 1The probably most comprehensive treatments in recent years has been put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Boix (2003). established.”
BackgroundA Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments
Stock, J. H., Wright, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2002) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/073500102288618658 · Cited by 4,274 · cited 4×
“As 7See Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) or Shea (1997) for a discussion on weak instruments 8I computed the (unweighted) share of households which report that at least one member receives remittances for those households which report to have sent at least one migrant who didn’t yet return in the…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialRoss, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409 · cited 1×
“Ross (2001), for example, identifies a “taxation effect”, meaning that the more a state has to finance its expenditure through tax revenue, as opposed to natural resource (or other) rents, the more likely it is to be a democracy.”
BackgroundGeneralized reduced rank tests using the singular value decomposition
Kleibergen, F., & Paap, R. (2006) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.02.011 · Cited by 2,703
Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
The Political Economy of the Resource Curse
Ross, M. L. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100008200 · Cited by 1,991 · cited 2×
“…exception here 5(WBG 2006) gives the examples of Vietnam and Tajikistan, where remittances through formal channels increased significantly (in the Tajik case almost fourfold) after taxes on such transactions were removed 6A good general discussion on the resource curse is provided by Ross (1999).”
BackgroundModernization: Theories and Facts
Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0004 · Cited by 1,983 · cited 2×
“A big part of the democratization literature has analyzed the effect of economic growth, understood as the effect of the income level and its distribution, on the probability for a democratic system to emerge and/or to prevail.1 In a well known study Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argue”
BackgroundTesting for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J., & Yogo, M. (2002) · doi:10.3386/t0284 · Cited by 1,842
Barro, R. J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250107 · Cited by 1,746
Political foundations of the resource curse
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008 · Cited by 1,706 · cited 2×
“On the theory side, a formal political-economy model of the resource curse, with an extension to autocratic regimes, is provided by Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006).”
Method(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-3041 · Cited by 1,352 · cited 1×
“…that a higher income does not promote a transition to democracy, but rather, prevents countries from falling back into dictatorship once democracy has been 1The probably most comprehensive treatments in recent years has been put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Boix (2003). established.”
BackgroundYang, D. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02134.x · Cited by 1,307 · cited 1×
“Regarding school attendance, McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) identify a negative effect of family migration experience for Mexico, while Cox and Ureta (2003) and Yang (2008) find a positive effect of remittances for the cases of El Salvador and the Philippines respectively.”
(2006) · The Elgar Companion to Development Studies · doi:10.4337/9781847202864.00031 · Cited by 1,269
What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis
Massey, D. S., & Espinosa, K. E. (1997) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231037 · Cited by 1,256 · cited 2×
“It is therefore a common approach to use historic migration flows, which will influence current flows only through the importance of social interactions (see, for example, Massey and Espinosa (1997) ), but are far enough back in time not to influence the outcome variable.”
BackgroundInternational migration, remittances, and schooling: evidence from El Salvador
Edwards, A. C., & Ureta, M. (2003) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(03)00115-9 · Cited by 1,174
Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4695 · Cited by 1,155 · cited 4×
“As a result the IFE is widely credited with having assured non-fraudulent elections at the federal level, starting with the 1997 midterm elections in which the PRI for the first time lost its majority in the lower house (Lawson (2000); Magaloni (2006)).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNetwork effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico
Mckenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.11.003 · Cited by 933
Boix, C., & Stokes, S. C. (2003) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0019 · Cited by 921
Migration networks and microenterprises in Mexico
Woodruff, C., & Zenteno, R. (2007) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.03.006 · Cited by 894 · cited 1×
“This was the first rail line to connect Mexico City directly with the border (Spener (2005), pg.5), the best connected to the American rail network (Woodruff and Zenteno (2007); Spener (2005) pg.5), and up until the late 1920’s, the westernmost and northernmost point of entry to be reached by rail…”
BackgroundInstrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: A Simple Measure
Shea, J. (1997) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.1997.79.2.348 · Cited by 824 · cited 3×
“7See Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) or Shea (1997) for a discussion on weak instruments 8I computed the (unweighted) share of households which report that at least one member receives remittances for those households which report to have sent at least one migrant who didn’t yet return in the five years prior to the in…”
BackgroundMethodAre Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines
Yang, D., & Choi, H. (2007) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhm003 · Cited by 788 · cited 2×
“More recently, Yang (2007) confirms that remittances act as an insurance against exogenous income shocks in poor Philippine households and Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) find that for the case of Mexico, migration improves child health through remittances as well as through knowledge transfers.”
BackgroundResource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa
Jensen, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414004266867 · Cited by 725 · cited 1×
“For the case of Africa, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) show that the more important the natural resource sector is in a given country, the less likely it is to be a democracy.”
BackgroundMigradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case
Durand, J., Parrado, E. A., & Massey, D. S. (1996) · International Migration Review · doi:10.1177/019791839603000202 · Cited by 549 · cited 1×
“Some early studies have inquired how remittances are spent (Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey 1996) or on their impact on local economic activity (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996).”
BackgroundWhy Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective
Greene, K. F. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511509803 · Cited by 529
International migration and development in mexican communities
Durand, J., Kandel, W., Parrado, E. A., & Massey, D. S. (1996) · Demography · doi:10.2307/2061875 · Cited by 529 · cited 2×
“Some early studies have inquired how remittances are spent ( Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey 1996 ) or on their impact on local economic activity (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996).”
BackgroundWhy dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-6403 · Cited by 479
The Effects of Migration on Child Health in Mexico
Hildebrandt, N., & McKenzie, D. J. (2005) · Economía · doi:10.1353/eco.2006.0009 · Cited by 452 · cited 1×
“More recently, Yang (2007) confirms that remittances act as an insurance against exogenous income shocks in poor Philippine households and Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) find that for the case of Mexico, migration improves child health through remittances as well as through knowledge transfers.”
BackgroundPrzeworski, A. (2005) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4 · Cited by 391 · cited 2×
“Such a mechanism is in turn provided in a later paper by Przeworski (2005).”
BackgroundDoes High Income Promote Democracy?
Londregan, J. B., & Poole, K. T. (1996) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1996.0024 · Cited by 358 · cited 1×
“Other authors who find evidence for a higher income to promote democracy include Londregan and Poole (1996) and Barro (1999).”
BackgroundRemittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?
Abdih, Y., Chami, R., Dagher, J., & Montiel, P. (2012) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.014 · Cited by 332
Emigration and wages in source countries: Evidence from Mexico
Mishra, P. (2007) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.09.002 · Cited by 331 · cited 2×
“Mishra (2007) finds that emigration had a strong positive effect on Mexican wages.”
BackgroundWhy Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments
Wantchekon, L. (2002) · The Journal of African Development · Cited by 250
International Migration, Remittances, and Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador
Edwards, A. C., & Ureta, M. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9766 · Cited by 224
Courting democracy in Mexico: party strategies and electoral institutions
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1816 · Cited by 181
Exit without Leaving: Political Disengagement in High Migration Municipalities in Mexico
Goodman, G. L., & Hiskey, J. T. (2008) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041508x12911362382751 · Cited by 153 · cited 5×
“Following Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006), Mexico could be described as a “dominant party system” or an “electoral authoritarianism”. In such a system the dominant party is forced to hold elections on a regular basis, and faces a certain degree of scrutiny from other social actors, but is able to perpetuate itself i…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMexican Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities
Orozco, M., & LaPointe, M. (2004) · Journal of international affairs · Cited by 152
Does Migration Make Rural Households More Productive? Evidence from Mexico
Taylor, J. E., & López‐Feldman, A. (2009) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220380903198463 · Cited by 151
The International migration of women
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-6860 · Cited by 149
Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Party Hegemony in MexicoPreprint
Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., & Weingast, B. R. V. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1153510 · Cited by 109 · cited 1×
“Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast (2003) use a migration proxy as an explanatory variable in their work on transfer payments from the state and federal levels to municipalities.”
BackgroundHeaven's door: immigration policy and the American economy
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-3438 · Cited by 107
Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy
Massey, D. S., & Borjas, G. J. (2001) · Contemporary Sociology A Journal of Reviews · doi:10.2307/2654354 · Cited by 94
International Migration and Globalization of Domestic Politics
(2004) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203488379 · Cited by 93
Politcal Foundations of the Resource CursePreprint
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2003) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 68
Dictatorships as a Political Dutch DiseasePreprint
Lam, R., & Wantchekon, L. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 58
Shihata, I. F. I. (1999) · BRILL eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789004635012_023 · Cited by 53
Book Review: The Bracero Program
Faught, J. D., & Craig, R. (1973) · International Migration Review · doi:10.2307/3002103 · Cited by 31
Torres, D. L. O., & Lorena, A. C. (2007) · Cited by 7
Mexican Migration to the United States, 1882-1992: A Long Twentieth Century of Coyotaje
Spener, D. (2017) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 4
Cited by
Remittances and Democratization
Escribà-Folch, A., Meseguer, C., & Wright, J. (2015) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12180 · Cited by 169
“14 Empirical tests of this argument in Mexico show that remittances decrease votes cast for the incumbent and benefit the opposition by weakening of clientelistic ties (Pfutze 2012; 2013).”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Pfutze, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-05
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 159-175
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079920066
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 56.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.