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Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab
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“A well-established result in the literature on the acceptability of climate policies is the perceived ineffectiveness of Pigouvian instruments (e.g., Dresner et al. 2006; Kallbekken, Kroll, and Cherry 2011; Baranzini and Carattini 2017).”
From Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion (2022) · cites this paper as Kallbekken, Kroll, and Cherry 2011
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-07
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-64
- ISSN
- 0095-0696 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2043940452
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 28.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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